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Human beings organize their intuitive understanding of the world in terms of
causes and eﬀects. Primitive humanity posited gods and spirits as invisible causes
of phenomena they did not comprehend. As our attempts to understand the world
began to be formalized and codiﬁed as empirical science, the emphasis on discern-
ing cause-eﬀect relationships remained. Though we, the modern humanity, are
armed with powerful computers, sophisticated technology, and highly developed
mathematics and statistics, our fundamental questions remain the same as those
of our cave dwelling ancestors – we seek to understand the causes of windfalls
and misfortunes that befall us, what eﬀects our actions have, and what would
happen if the past were diﬀerent from what it is. This thesis will address these
ancient questions with the rigor and generality of modern mathematics.
Using the framework of graphical causal models which formalizes a variety
of causal queries, such as causal eﬀects, counterfactuals and path-speciﬁc eﬀects
as certain types of probability distributions, I will develop algorithms which will
evaluate these probability distributions from available information; prove that
whenever these algorithms fail to evaluate a query, no other method could suc-
xivceed; provide characterizations based on directed graphs for cases where these
algorithms do succeed; and ﬁnally show how a class of constraints placed on
the causal model by its directed graph are due to conditional independence in
these probability distributions, and how these conditional independencies can be
exploited for testing causal theories.
xvCHAPTER 1
Introduction
Causality is fundamental to our understanding of the natural world. Causal
questions and claims are a part of everyday speech, as well as legal, scientiﬁc and
philosophical vocabulary. In discussing causal questions, just as in discussing
questions of arithmetic or geometry, human beings seem to reach consensus on
meaning. That isn’t to say that all causal notions are unambiguous and crystal
clear, but there is broad agreement on what claims such as “smoking causes can-
cer,” or “carbon dioxide emissions contribute to global warming” mean. However,
unlike arithmetic or geometry, there isn’t a universally agreed upon formalization
of causality. Instead, the consensus on causal issues seems to be driven largely
by intuition. Even the most honed intuition can fail or lead astray, so formal,
mathematical approaches to causality are preferable. Fortunately, the existence
of consensus suggests that some formal structure for representing and reason-
ing about causality is present in the human brain. Though the exact way in
which we reason about causality is not known, there are a number of formaliza-
tion attempts which can claim to lead to reasonable conclusions which generally
agree with human intuition [Wri21], [Ney23], [Tin37], [Lew73], [Rub74], [Rob87],
[Pea00]. In this thesis, I will represent causality using graphical causal models,
a representation method based on directed graphs and probability theory which
was independently discovered multiple times during the 20th century, with vari-
ous degrees of rigor [Wri21], [Pea95].
11.1 Causality and Graphs
People generally distinguish causes from eﬀects because the former inﬂuence the
latter, but not vice versa. Certainly in some cases involving dynamic equilibrium,
like economic or physical systems, mutual causation is possible. 1 Yet even in
such cases human beings tend to untangle the inﬂuences involved in causal loops
by considering distinct causes and eﬀects. Causality thus implies directionality
of inﬂuence. In addition to directionality, people assume that causal inﬂuence is
modular, which means that full knowledge of all direct causes of a given eﬀect is
suﬃcient for concluding the eﬀect regardless of the state of the rest of the world.
Of course, when considering causal questions, human beings don’t have access to
the world “as it is.” Instead, they typically have in mind some model of causal
interactions of some part of the world, at a particular level of granularity. In
reality, no model, with the possible exception of extremely detailed models of
quantum interactions, will truly contain all direct causes of a given observable
eﬀect. Instead, whenever a given cause explicitly named in a model is ﬁxed, an
untold number of intermediate causes and eﬀects omitted from the model operate,
according to natural laws, to bring about the explicitly named eﬀect. Neither the
notion of “direct cause,” nor the intuitive notion of modularity of causal inﬂuence,
is absolute but dependent on the model. Nevertheless, the notion of modularity
is meaningful when applied to a particular model, since it implies a much weaker
claim, namely that the knowledge of all causes considered direct for a particular
eﬀect in the model implies no other variable in the model can inﬂuence that eﬀect.
These properties of directionality and modularity can be naturally expressed
using directed graphs. Perhaps due to the intuitiveness of such a visual represen-
1For instance, it’s well known that supply aﬀects demand and vice versa. Similarly, it’s
possible to contrive physical systems with mutual causation, like two boards forming a “tent”
propping each other up. I am grateful to Sheldon Smith for this example.
2tation, the use of directed graphs to represent causality is an idea that arose mul-
tiple times, in genetics [Wri21], econometrics [Haa43], and artiﬁcial intelligence
[Pea88], [SGS93], [Pea00]. In each case, variables of interest were represented
as nodes in the graph, while an arrow from parent to child node stood for a
direct cause-eﬀect relationship between the corresponding variables. Associated
with each node is an autonomous causal mechanism, independent of other such
mechanisms, which determined the value of that node depending on the values
of its parents in the graph. Directed graphs with this kind of interpretation are
called causal diagrams, and the causal domains they represent are called graphical
causal models [Pea00].
1.2 The Causal Hierarchy
An example of a graphical causal model is an electronic circuit. In a circuit,
causal mechanisms correspond to logic gates, while variables are input and out-
put wires, along with intermediate values computed by logic gates. Circuits and
propositional logic in general have been applied to a wide variety of problems.
Nevertheless, our knowledge of many interesting domains such as medicine, law,
social interactions, economics, and so on is incomplete. Our ignorance manifests
in two ways. Firstly, we rarely understand speciﬁc causal mechanisms so well
that we can describe them in terms of a function. Secondly, we rarely observe
all causes which help determine observable eﬀects in our models. In order to
construct causal models faithful to the realities of our ignorance, we need to
handle uncertainty; the mathematical framework used for this purpose is prob-
ability theory. Fortunately, the framework of graphical causal models can be
easily extended to handle uncertainty. We model unobserved causes with observ-
able eﬀects by considering certain root nodes in the graph as unobservable, while
3ignorance of functional mechanisms can be represented by only exposing coarser
features of the model than causal mechanisms themselves, for example, condi-
tional probabilities of observing particular values given some input values. To
handle our uncertainty in a principled way, we endow unobservable nodes with a
probability distribution. This unobservable distribution, together with unknown
causal mechanisms speciﬁed in the model induce a probability distribution over
observable variables. This distribution is generally accessible, since we are free
to collect statistics pertaining to the observable parts of our domains.
A wide variety of causal queries, such as those concerning eﬀects of actions, or
counterfactual situations are represented as probability distributions ultimately
derived from unobserved variables and causal mechanisms. I will consider a
hierarchy consisting of three kinds of causal queries in graphical causal models.
The lowest level in the hierarchy consists of what I call associational questions. A
typical question of this sort is “I have taken an aspirin an hour ago. How likely am
I to get a headache?” Such questions are represented as marginal or conditional
distributions over observable quantities (e.g., P(headache|aspirin)), and can be
computed from the joint distribution over all variables in the domain. Much
research in statistics and artiﬁcial intelligence is devoted to ﬁnding answers to
these sorts of questions when the knowledge of the joint distribution is constrained
by missing or limited information. It is well-known that association does not
imply causation, and associational queries are therefore not strictly speaking
causal. Nevertheless, I place such queries at the base of the hierarchy because
techniques developed for answering them will be invaluable for computing answers
to more intricate questions, and because associational statements form an easily
available base from which such computations can begin.
Placed above associational questions in the hierarchy are questions about ef-
4fects of interventions imposed on the causal model from the outside. Interventions
disrupt the normal ﬂow of inﬂuence from causes to eﬀects by setting some set
of variables to speciﬁc values, regardless of what the normal causes of that set
dictate. An example of a question that involves eﬀects of interventions is “I am
about to take an aspirin. Will it help my headache?” Here I model a decision to
take medicine as disrupting the normal schedule of daily food intake. I denote
interventions using the do(.) notation used by [Pea00], where do(x) means that
a set of variables X is set to values x. The eﬀects of interventions will be repre-
sented using interventional distributions denoted with either the do(.) operator
past the conditioning bar or a subscript denoting a set of intervened values (e.g.,
P(y|do(x)), or Px(y)). The eﬀect of intervention do(x) on a variable set Y is
often called the causal eﬀect of do(x) on Y.
The ﬁnal set of questions, placed above both interventional and associational
queries in the hierarchy, involves hypothetical, “what-if” situations. An example
of such a counterfactual question would be “I took an aspirin and my headache
is gone; would I have a headache had I not taken an aspirin?” As their name
implies, counterfactuals often involve conﬂicts between the true state of aﬀairs
and the hypothetical situation involved in the question. Despite these conﬂicts,
human beings frequently invoke and evaluate counterfactuals both in everyday
situations, and in technical domains. Nevertheless, it is not obvious how to an-
swer counterfactual questions correctly without complete knowledge of all aspects
of a causal model. Since some aspects of a causal model may not be experimen-
tally testable, the use of counterfactuals has been the subject of some criticism
[Daw00]. I will represent counterfactuals as joint or conditional distributions over
sets of events resulting from multiple, possibly conﬂicting interventions.
I also consider a special class of eﬀect queries known as path-speciﬁc eﬀects.
5Such queries arise in situations where we want to know the eﬀect of a given
intervention do(x) on the outcome Y , but only along certain causal paths. These
sorts of eﬀects come up often in policy analysis [Pea01], and in legal cases. For
instance, gender discrimination occurs if a person’s gender has a direct eﬀect
on the hiring decision. However, it is permissible that gender inﬂuence certain
factors which themselves have a strong inﬂuence on a person’s suitability for the
job. For example, women may, on average, be more aﬀable than men in customer-
facing situations. In evaluating claims of discrimination, we are interested in
determining whether gender had no direct eﬀect hiring, while possibly having
an indirect eﬀect. Despite calling these kinds of queries path-speciﬁc eﬀects, I
will show later that they can be computed from counterfactuals, and so properly
belong in the third level of the causal hierarchy.
1.3 Identiﬁcation
This thesis is concerned with answering questions in the causal hierarchy. The
answering strategies available to us naturally depend on the complexity of the
question. Associational questions involving certain observable variables, such as
headache, and aspirin, can be computed from the joint probability distribution
over all observables in the domain, using basic probability theory. In practice
the joint probability distribution is generally not available, and must instead
be estimated, using techniques developed in statistics and artiﬁcial intelligence.
However, for the purposes of this thesis, I simplify the task by assuming that we
are given the true probability distribution representing the domain, rather than
an approximation obtained from some estimation procedure using a ﬁnite set of
samples. Given this assumption, it is a simple matter to compute an arbitrary
associational question from the corresponding joint distribution.
6Computing causal eﬀects is a more diﬃcult task because interventions change
probability distributions. The stochastic behavior of the original domain, sum-
marized by the joint distribution over the observable variables, cannot be trans-
lated in a straightforward way to the stochastic behavior of the post-intervention
domain, represented by the interventional distribution.
There are two main approaches to computing causal eﬀects. The ﬁrst is the
direct approach: implement the intervention do(x) directly in an individual, cir-
cuit, living cell, etc. and observe the consequences. More generally, if we want
to compute the eﬀect of an intervention in a population, we can perform a ran-
domized experiment [Fis26] where every member of the population in question
is randomly assigned either to the group subjected to the manipulation, or the
control group where no manipulation is performed. Needless to say, in most situ-
ations of interest, direct manipulation is not possible (e.g., no way to manipulate
gender), too expensive (e.g., public policy changes), or unethical (e.g., manipu-
lation of human bodies in medicine). It is desirable, then, to use a less direct
approach to inferring causal eﬀects.
The second approach involves ﬁnding a way to link the eﬀect of an interven-
tion with the probability distribution associated with the original, unmanipulated
model. If such a link can be found, it becomes possible to compute causal eﬀects
from observational studies alone, without performing randomized experiments or
manipulations of any kind. This approach to causal inference bears a striking
resemblance to logical inference: we have some premises, in this case an obser-
vational distribution, and we are interested in computing conclusions of interest,
or more generally as many conclusions as possible. However, unlike conventional
logical inference, we are not operating over sentences in a particular logic, but
instead over probability distributions, using axioms of probability and perhaps
7additional rules speciﬁc to graphical causal models. Causal inference of this sort
is called identiﬁcation [Pea95], [Pea00].
Though identiﬁcation was the framework used in the literature to compute
causal eﬀects from observations, it is a more general notion which can be applied
any time we wish to deduce conclusions from premises in some set of models.
I will use this generality to answer not only questions involving causal eﬀects,
but also counterfactuals. In this thesis, I view counterfactuals as distributions
which span multiple hypothetical worlds, often with contradictory features (e.g.,
in one world aspirin was taken, in another it was not). We could consider the
version of the identiﬁcation problem analogous with causal eﬀects, where we try
to determine which counterfactuals can be computed from observational distri-
butions. However, even if we permit ourselves to perform arbitrary experiments,
it’s unclear how we could evaluate counterfactual questions with such conﬂicts,
since, for example, no experimental setup exists which both gives and doesn’t give
someone aspirin. To simplify, I will consider the following identiﬁcation problem:
assuming we allow ourselves any experiment in a given causal model, represented
by the set of all possible interventional distributions in this model, can we infer a
given counterfactual? Of course, if I can express a counterfactual in terms of some
set of interventional distributions, those distributions may, in turn, be expressible
in terms of observational distributions. In this case I will be able to identify a
counterfactual from observations. I will consider a similar identiﬁcation problem
for path-speciﬁc eﬀects, which are a particular kind of counterfactual.
1.4 Dormant Independence
Answering causal questions from observational studies using graphical causal as-
sumptions is an important problem in itself, however advances in this area also
8have useful applications for inducing and testing causal theories expressed as
causal graphs. A given causal graph constrains probability distributions in any
model consistent with this graph in two ways. Firstly, such distributions all con-
tain certain conditional independencies which can be read oﬀ from the graph
using the notion of d-separation [Pea86], [Ver86], [Pea88], which I will discuss in
Chapter 3. Secondly, such distributions also obey certain algebraic constraints,
noted by Verma [VP90].
Conditional independence constraints are relatively well-understood and fre-
quently used by causal induction algorithms, such as IC [VP90], [Pea00], and FCI
[SGS93]. For instance, such algorithms are able to conclude in certain classes of
models that two nodes X and Y are not connected by an edge in a causal dia-
gram if the corresponding random variables are conditionally independent in the
observed distribution. On the other hand, algebraic constraints are still relatively
poorly understood and seldom used for induction and testing.
I will consider a special subset of algebraic constraints which is easy to un-
derstand and apply, and which arises from “dormant independencies,” in other
words independencies that prevail in post-intervention distributions. I will de-
velop a complete algorithm for determining if a conditional independence exists
between two sets of variables in an interventional distribution which is also identi-
ﬁable, and show how this algorithm can be used to test certain features of causal
diagrams which ordinary conditional independence cannot test.
1.5 Thesis Outline
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses related work in graphical
models and causal inference which lead to the questions considered in this the-
9sis. Chapter 3 precisely deﬁnes graphical causal models, the hierarchy of causal
queries I consider, the notion of identiﬁcation which I will use to answer these
queries, and other mathematical machinery needed to obtain my results. Chapter
4 considers the problem of identifying causal eﬀects from observational studies.
Chapter 5 considers the problem of identifying counterfactuals from experimental
studies. Chapter 6 generalizes the notion of causal eﬀect to the situation where
we are interested only in certain paths, and considers the problem of identifying
such path-speciﬁc eﬀects. Chapter 7 considers the problem of determining if an
identiﬁable dormant independence exists between two sets of variables, and how




In this chapter, I overview the conceptual developments over the last century
that culminated in the modern understanding of causal inference.
2.1 Graphical Models
Causal modeling using directed graphs started with the seminal work of Sewall
Wright on path analysis [Wri21]. Linear models considered by Wright became
the subject of study in the statistics community under the name of Structural
Equation Models [Wri21], [Haa43], [Kli05]. More recently, the use of graphs to
represent uncertainty became popular in the ﬁelds of artiﬁcial intelligence and
statistics with the introduction of Bayesian Networks [Pea85], [Pea88], [LS88],
[Lau96].
It soon became apparent that the use of graphs to represent uncertainty is a
powerful idea which arose multiple times and the emerging formalism of Graphical
Models [JW02] subsumed many special cases developed in separate disciplines,
such as Kalman ﬁlters in engineering [Kal60], Markov random ﬁelds in physics
[Bes74], and statistical mechanics [Bax92], hidden Markov models in signal pro-
cessing [Rab89], and many others [RG99]. Common to these approaches is the
decomposition of the joint probability distribution representing the domain of
interest into tractable pieces, and the use of graphs to mirror this decomposition
11via various Markov properties. Most graphical models serve as a compact rep-
resentation of the underlying distribution, and do not make any causal claims,
though causal knowledge is often used in their construction.
2.2 Causal Inference
More recent work [VP90], [Pea93a], [SGS93], [Pea95], [Pea00] has added a causal
interpretation to graphical models, with directed arrows in the graph being in-
terpreted as causal inﬂuence between variables. This interpretation allowed for-
malization of causal inference, posing and answering an additional class of causal
questions, such as interventional and counterfactual queries I discussed in the
introduction. Interventional queries P(y|do(x)) represent the notion of causal ef-
fects, which is ubiquitous in both informal and professional discourse, and forms
an important building block from which our understanding of the world is built.
While randomized experiments can often be used to estimate causal eﬀects, in
practice such experiments can be expensive to conduct. Furthermore, certain
forms of experimentation (e.g., drug testing, surgical alteration, etc.) may be
illegal or unethical to conduct on human subjects. It is desirable, therefore, to
determine conditions under which a given causal eﬀect can be computed from
observational studies, which are generally less expensive to conduct, less objec-
tionable on human subjects, and therefore more common. The formal problem
of characterizing models where queries of interest may be computable from lim-
ited information is known as the identiﬁcation problem [Pea95], [Pea00]. Iden-
tiﬁcation of causal eﬀects has received considerable attention in the literature,
with two approaches being dominant. The ﬁrst approach deals not with causal
models themselves, but with causal diagrams, and attempts to derive graphical
conditions a model must satisfy before a given causal eﬀect can be computed.
12A number of such graphical conditions are known, for example the Back-Door
Criterion [Pea93b], and the Front-Door Criterion [Pea95]. While these two con-
ditions are intuitive and easy to state, their suﬀer from the problem of limited
applicability. The second approach views causal inference as a special case of
logical inference, and attempts to derive axioms to codify behavior of quantities
derived from causal models, and rules of inference to reason about such quanti-
ties appropriately. [GP98], [Hal00] proposed a complete set of axioms for causal
inference, while [Pea93c] proposed a set of three rules of do-calculus for reason-
ing about interventional distributions. While the resulting reasoning systems are
more general, the constructed proofs can be diﬃcult for the unaided mind to
follow. Moreover such systems suﬀer from standard diﬃculties of theorem prov-
ing: large search spaces of possible proofs, and lack of termination guarantees.
The algorithms in this thesis, which can be viewed as simpliﬁcations and elab-
orations of Jin Tian’s original algorithms for causal eﬀect identiﬁcation [TP02],
[Tia04], [Tia02], combine the strengths of both approaches – we can derive intu-
itive graphical conditions while at the same time retaining the generality, in fact
completeness, of the logical methods. A number of interesting corollaries follow
from the completeness of these algorithms. For instance, my results imply that
do-calculus is complete for identifying all causal eﬀect queries. Some of these
results and corollaries were derived independently elsewhere [HV06b], [HV06a].
2.3 Potential Outcomes and Counterfactuals
Another strand of work on causal modeling did not employ graphs and dealt
with the so called potential response variables [Ney23], [Rub74], written as Yx(u)
or Y (x,u). This notation is taken to mean “the value attained by Y in unit
u under intervention do(x).” If the domain is not observable at the unit level,
13we can average over possible units to attain random variables Yx which I will
call counterfactual variables, since they can be viewed as responses to hypothet-
ical interventions. Research in the potential response framework has sought to
establish rules governing such variables, and the way these variables relate to
those actually observed. Important causal assumptions such as exogeneity can
be expressed in terms of probabilistic independence among certain counterfac-
tual variables [Pea00], while evaluation of causal eﬀects based on g-estimation
[Rob87] assumes that such counterfactual independencies hold. Recent work
on axiomatizing causal reasoning [GP98], [Pea00], [Hal00] has shown that the
framework of potential outcomes and the framework of graphical causal mod-
els both describe the same mathematical objects, probability distributions over
counterfactual variables. This uniﬁcation allowed the expression of counterfac-
tual independence in terms of graphs, and evaluation of counterfactual queries
themselves if all parameters in a causal model are known [BP94a], [BP94b]. I
provide a generalization of this approach by providing a graphical representation
of independence among counterfactual variables in an arbitrary number of hypo-
thetical worlds, and provide complete algorithms for evaluating counterfactuals
from experimental studies. The results of such studies are more likely to be avail-
able than complete knowledge of all model parameters as required by previous
work [BP94b].
2.4 Natural and Path-speciﬁc Eﬀects
[RG92] and [Pea01] introduced the notion of direct and indirect eﬀects, meant
to represent cases where we are interested in the eﬀect of an intervention do(x)
on an outcome variable Y , but only along certain causal paths. Such cases arise,
for instance, when discussing discrimination, where the question is whether a
14given characteristic, say gender, has a direct eﬀect on the decision (e.g., hiring,
admission, lease, etc.) I say direct eﬀect because indirect eﬀect of gender on hiring
does not constitute discrimination. For instance, an employer may hire a greater
percentage of women, if women are more qualiﬁed on average than men, and this
would not necessarily be considered discriminatory. Formalizing the notion of
direct eﬀect, where indirect eﬀects are “forbidden,” or an indirect eﬀect where
direct eﬀects are “forbidden,” requires probabilities over nested counterfactual
variables [Pea01]. [Pea01] further provides some conditions where such eﬀects
can be identiﬁed from the causal graph and observational studies. Subsequently,
[Pea01] and [ASP05] consider a generalization of natural eﬀects to cases where
arbitrary sets of edges are “forbidden.” These generalized natural eﬀects are
termed path-speciﬁc eﬀects. In this thesis, I will provide a complete method for
identifying such eﬀects in causal diagrams without latent variables, along with
a simple graphical characterization of such identiﬁable path-speciﬁc eﬀects. 1
Furthermore, I will use the results on identifying counterfactual distributions to
provide identiﬁcation criteria for path-speciﬁc eﬀects in semi-Markovian causal
diagrams.
2.5 Algebraic Constraints and Causal Induction
One of the most important problems in causal inference is the problem of causal
induction, namely inferring aspects of the causal model, such as the graph, from
observations. Inferring the structure of graphical models has a long history in
Artiﬁcial Intelligence, with two approaches being dominant. The score-based
approach [Suz93], [LB94] assigns a score to each possible causal structure, where
“small” structures, and structures likely given the observed data are given high
1Some of these results were derived as a joint work with Chen Avin
15scores. Score-based algorithms perform a search for high scoring structures. The
constraint-based approach rules out causal structures which are inconsistent with
various constraints imposed by the observed data. Well-known constraint-based
algorithms are the IC algorithm [VP90], [Pea00] and the FCI algorithm [SGS93].
These algorithms return a set of all causal graphs which have the same set of d-
separation statements (and the corresponding independencies) as the graph of
the model which generated the observed distribution.
Constraint-based induction algorithms generally only make use of constraints
implied by conditional independencies, although causal graphs entail a wider class
of algebraic constraints, ﬁrst noted in [VP90]. I extend the identiﬁcation results
in this thesis to show that a special subset of such algebraic constraints is ob-
tained from conditional independence in interventional distributions, which I call
“dormant independence.” Although full use of dormant independence for causal
induction remains an open problem, I show how this kind of independence can be
used for model testing by giving an algorithm which uses dormant independence
to rule out extraneous edges from causal graphs.
16CHAPTER 3
Notation and Deﬁnitions
In this chapter I go over the deﬁnitions and mathematical machinery used in
causal inference.
3.1 Causal Models and Causal Diagrams
The primary object of causal inquiry is a probabilistic causal model. I will denote
variables by uppercase letters, and their values by lowercase letters. Similarly,
sets of variables will be denoted by bold uppercase, and sets of values by bold
lowercase.
Deﬁnition 1 A probabilistic causal model (PCM) is a tuple M =  U,V,F,P(u) ,
where
• U is a set of background or exogenous variables, which cannot be observed
or experimented on, but which aﬀect the rest of the model.
• V is a set {V1,...,Vn} of observable or endogenous variables. These vari-
ables are functionally dependent on some subset of U ∪ V.
• F is a set of functions {f1,...,fn} such that each fi is a mapping from a
subset of U∪V\{Vi} to Vi, and such that
S
F is a function from U to V.
• P(u) is a joint probability distribution over U.
17The set of variables V in this deﬁnition represents the part of the causal do-
main we can see and experiment on, the set of functions F corresponds to the
causal mechanisms which determine the values of V, while U represents the back-
ground context that inﬂuences V, yet remains outside it. Our ignorance of the
background context is represented by a distribution P(u). This distribution, to-
gether with the mechanisms in F, induces a distribution P(v) over the observable
domain.
The causal diagram, our vehicle for expressing causal assumptions, contains
two kinds of edges: directed edges which represent direct causal relationships, and
bidirected edges which represent “non-causal dependence,” or confounding. A
causal diagram is deﬁned by the causal model as follows. Each observable variable
Vi ∈ V corresponds to a vertex in the graph. Any two variables X ∈ U ∪ V,
Vj ∈ V such that X appears in the description of fj are connected by a directed
arrow from X to Vj. In this thesis, we assume that all U variables are mutually
independent, in other words P(u) =
Q
i P(ui), and that each Ui ∈ U appears
in at most two functions in F. 1 If there is some Uk ∈ U which appears in the
functions fi and fj of two observable nodes Vi,Vj, instead of drawing two directed
arcs from Uk to Vi and Vj, we can draw a bidirected arc between Vi and Vj and
omit Uk from the graph entirely. Similarly, U variables with a single child can
be omitted from the graph. The graph deﬁned in this way from a causal model
M is said to be induced by M. Fig. 3.1 and Fig. 3.2 show some examples of
causal diagrams. I will only consider recursive causal models, those models which
induce acyclic directed graphs.
1Most of the results in this thesis do not depend on this, and can easily be extended to
the general case of the same U variable inﬂuencing multiple functions. Similarly, if some U
variables are dependent, this dependence can be represented by bidirected arcs
18multiple worlds, which will serve as the formalization of counterfactual queries.
Consider a conjunction of events γ = y1
x1 ∧ ... ∧ yk
xk. If all the subscripts xi are
the same and equal to x, γ is simply the set of values that variables take on
in Mx, and P(γ) = Px(y1,...,yk). However, if the actions do(xi) are not the
same, and potentially contradictory, a single submodel is no longer suﬃcient.
Instead, γ is invoking multiple causal worlds, each represented by a submodel
Mxi. I assume each submodel shares the same set of exogenous variables U,
corresponding to the shared “causal context” or background history of the hy-
pothetical worlds. Because the submodels are linked by common context, they
can really be considered as one large causal model, with its own induced graph,
and joint distribution over observable variables. P(γ) can then be deﬁned as
a marginal distribution in this causal model. Formally, P(γ) =
P
{u|u|=γ} P(u),
where u |= γ is taken to mean that each variable assignment in γ holds true in the
corresponding submodel of M when the exogenous variables U assume values u.
In this way, P(u) induces a distribution on all possible counterfactual variables
in M. I will represent counterfactual utterances by joint distributions such as
P(γ) or conditional distributions such as P(γ|δ), where γ and δ are conjunctions
of counterfactual events. [Pea00] (chapter 7) discusses counterfactuals, and their
probabilistic representation in greater depth.
Finally, I deﬁne path-speciﬁc eﬀects, which represent situations where we are
interested in the eﬀect of do(x) on Y along only certain causal paths. Graphically,
we can represent path-speciﬁc eﬀects in some causal model M by considering the
causal diagram G of M, where certain edges are marked as forbidden. Intuitively,
we would like the “ﬂow of inﬂuence” to proceed “downward” along causal paths
from do(x) to Y, just as in regular causal eﬀects, but not along forbidden edges.
How can we prevent ﬂow along a particular edge? We can remove forbidden
edges from the graph, but causal diagrams aren’t just arbitrary graphs, the edges
21represent the participation of the parent in the causal mechanism of the child.
The removal of the edge must correspond to a well-deﬁned of change of the
corresponding function.
Following [Pea01], I deﬁne this change as follows. For each variable W, let
Pa(W) be divided into two sets, Pa+(W) is the set of parents connected to W by
“allowed” edges, and Pa−(W) is the set of parents connected to W by “forbidden”
edges. Let x∗ be the reference values of X. For the purposes of determining the
value of W, we want Pa−(W) to behave as if X was set to x∗. The follow formal
deﬁnition is a generalization of the one found in [Pea01], which was applicable to
a single eﬀect variable X and single outcome variable Y .
Deﬁnition 2 (path-speciﬁc eﬀect) Let G be a causal diagram induced from a
model M, Y,X sets of variables, x,x∗ values of X. Let g be the subset “allowed”
edges for the ﬂow of eﬀect from do(x) to Y. Let Mg be deﬁned as follows. For
each observable W, if W ∈ X, replaced fW by a constant function which returns
the corresponding value of W in x. Otherwise, replace fW by another function f
g
W
which maps Pa+(W) to W as follows: f
g
W(pa+(w),u) = fW(pa+(w),pa−(w)∗,u),
where pa−(w)∗ are the values obtained by Pa−(W) under intervention do(x∗).
The path-speciﬁc eﬀect PSEg(x,x∗;Y,u) is deﬁned to equal Yx(u) − Yx∗(u),
where both counterfactual value sets are from Mg.
If we wish to summarize the path-speciﬁc eﬀect over all settings of u, we
should resort to the expectation of the above diﬀerence, or the expected path-
speciﬁc eﬀect. To identify this eﬀect, we need to identify P(yx) and P(yx∗) in
Mg. For our purposes we can restrict our attention to P(yx), as the second term
corresponds to the quantity P(yx∗) in the original model M, which corresponds
to an ordinary causal eﬀect expression P(y|do(x∗)).
22in M which agree on θ will also agree on φ.
If φ is θ-identiﬁable in T, I write T,θ ⊢id φ. Otherwise, I write T,θ  ⊢id φ.
The above deﬁnition leads immediately to the following corollary which we will
use to prove non-identiﬁability results.
Corollary 1 Let T be a description of a class of models M. Assume there exist
M1,M2 ∈ M that share objects θ, while φ in M1 is diﬀerent from φ in M2. Then
T,θ  ⊢id φ.
In our context, the objects φ,θ are probability distributions derived from the
PCM, where θ represents available information, while φ represents the quantity
of interest. The description T is a speciﬁcation of the properties shared by all
causal models under consideration, in other words, the set of assumptions we
wish to impose on those models. Since I chose causal graphs as a language for
specifying assumptions, T would correspond to a given graph.
3.4 D-separation
Next, I brieﬂy review the standard results which link directed graphs with in-
dependencies in probability distributions. Graphs earn their ubiquity as a spec-
iﬁcation language because they reﬂect in many ways the way people store ex-
periential knowledge, especially cause-eﬀect relationships. The ease with which
people embrace graphical metaphors for causal and probabilistic notions – ances-
try, neighborhood, ﬂow, and so on – are proof of this aﬃnity, and help ensure
that the assumptions speciﬁed are meaningful and reliable. A consequence of this
is that probabilistic dependencies among variables can be veriﬁed by checking if
the “ﬂow of inﬂuence” is blocked along paths linking the variables. By a path I
24mean a sequence of distinct nodes where each node is connected to the next in
the sequence by an edge. The precise way in which the ﬂow of dependence can
be blocked is deﬁned by the notion of d-separation [Pea86], [Pea88].
Deﬁnition 4 (d-separation) A path p in G is said to be d-separated by a set
Z if and only if either
1 p contains one of the following three patterns of edges: I → M → J,
I ↔ M → J, or I ← M → J, such that M ∈ Z, or
2 p contains one of the following three patterns of edges (called colliders):
I → M ← J, I ↔ M ← J, I ↔ M ↔ J, such that De(M)G ∩ Z = ∅.
Two sets X,Y are said to be d-separated given Z in G if all paths from X
to Y in G are d-separated by Z. Paths or sets which are not d-separated are
said to be d-connected. What allows us to connect this notion of blocking of
paths in a causal diagram to the notion of probabilistic independence among
variables is that the probability distribution over V and U in a causal model can
be represented as a product of factors each of which is a conditional distribution
of a given node given the values of its parents in the graph. In other words,
P(v,u) =
Q
i P(xi|pa(Xi)G), where pa(Xi)G is the values of the set of parents of
Xi in G. Whenever this property holds, it is said that G is an I-map [Pea88] of
P. The following well known theorem [VP88] links d-separation of vertex sets in
an I-map G with the independence of corresponding variable sets in P.
Theorem 1 If sets X and Y are d-separated by Z in G, then X is independent of
Y given Z in every P for which G is an I-map. Furthermore, the causal diagram
induced by any PCM M is an I-map of the distribution P(v,u) induced by M.
25Proof: It is not diﬃcult to see that if I restrict d-separation queries to a subset
of variables W in some graph G, the corresponding independencies in P(w) will
only hold whenever the d-separation statements hold. Furthermore, if I replace G
by a latent projection L [PV91], [Pea00], where I view variables V\W as hidden,
independencies in P(w) will only hold whenever the corresponding d-separation
statement (extended to include bidirected arcs) holds in L. ￿
I will abbreviate the statement of d-separation as (X ⊥ Y|Z)G, and corre-
sponding independence as (X ⊥ ⊥ Y|Z)P, following the notation of [Daw79].
3.5 Axioms of Causal Inference
Finally I consider the axioms and inference rules that will be needed. Since PCMs
contain probability distributions, the inference rules I would use to compute
queries in PCMs would certainly include the standard axioms of probability.
They also include a set of axioms which govern the behavior of counterfactuals,
such as Eﬀectiveness, Composition, etc. [GP98], [Hal00], [Pea00]. However, I will
concentrate on a set of three identities applicable to interventional distributions
known as do-calculus [Pea93c], [Pea00]:
• Rule 1: Px(y|z,w) = Px(y|w) if (Y ⊥ Z|X,W)Gx
• Rule 2: Px,z(y|w) = Px(y|z,w) if (Y ⊥ Z|X,W)Gx,z
• Rule 3: Px,z(y|w) = Px(y|w) if (Y ⊥ Z|X,W)Gx,z(w)
where Z(W) = Z \ An(W)GX. An(W)G is the set of ancestors of the set W in
G, Gx,y stands for a directed graph obtained from G by removing all incoming
arrows to X and all outgoing arrows from Y. The rules of do-calculus provide a




In this chapter, I consider the problem of identifying causal eﬀects from statistical
knowledge, represented by the observational distribution, and causal assumptions
encoded in a causal diagram. Starting with simplest graphs, I develop an inter-
pretation of causal eﬀect as resulting from a speciﬁc kind of ﬂow of probabilistic
inﬂuence along edges in the graph. I introduce successively more complicated
techniques which recover causal eﬀects from observational distributions in suc-
cessively more complicated graphs. At the same time, I show that in various
classes of graphs certain causal eﬀects cannot be identiﬁed by any means. These
developments culminate in an algorithm which either identiﬁes a given causal ef-
fect, or this causal eﬀect cannot be identiﬁed by any means in the causal diagram
given. Finally, I provide a simple extension to handle conditional interventional
distributions, and provide some important corollaries of my results.
4.1 Identifying Simple Eﬀects in Simple Graphs
Like probabilistic dependence, the notion of causal eﬀect of X on Y has an
interpretation in terms of ﬂow. Intuitively, X has an eﬀect on Y if changing X
causes Y to change. Since intervening on X cuts oﬀ X from the normal causal
inﬂuences of its parents in the graph, we can interpret the causal eﬀect of X on
Y as the ﬂow of dependence which leaves X via outgoing arrows only.
28Recall that the ultimate goal is to express distributions of the form P(y|do(x))
in terms of the joint distribution P(v). The interpretation of eﬀect as downward
dependence immediately suggests a set of graphs where this is possible. Specif-
ically, whenever all d-connected paths from X to Y are start with an outgoing
arrow from X (following [Pea00], I call such paths front-door), the causal eﬀect
P(y|do(x)) is equal to P(y|x). In graphs shown in Fig. 3.2 (a) and (b) causal
eﬀect P(y|do(x)) has this property.
In general, we don’t expect acting on X to produce the same eﬀect as observing
X due to the presence of paths which do not start with an outgoing arrow (I
will call such paths back-door as in [Pea00]) between X and Y. However, d-
separation gives us a way to block undesirable paths by conditioning. If we can
ﬁnd a set Z that blocks all back-door paths from X to Y, we obtain the following:
P(y|do(x)) =
P
z P(y|z,do(x))P(z|do(x)). The term P(y|z,do(x)) is reduced to
P(y|z,x) since the inﬂuence ﬂow from X to Y is blocked by Z. However, the act
of adjusting for Z introduced a new eﬀect we must compute, corresponding to the
term P(z|do(x)). If it so happens that no variable in Z is a descendant of X, we
can reduce this term to P(z) using the intuitive argument that acting on eﬀects
should not inﬂuence causes, or a more formal appeal to rule 3 of do-calculus.
Computing eﬀects in this way is always possible if we can ﬁnd a set Z blocking
all back-door paths which contains no descendants of X. This is known as the
back-door criterion [Pea93b], [Pea00]. Fig. 3.2 (c) and (d) shows some graphs
where the node z satisﬁes the back-door criterion with respect to P(y|do(x)),
which means P(y|do(x)) is identiﬁable.
The back-door criterion can fail – a common way involves a confounder that is
unobserved, which prevents adjusting for it. Surprisingly, it is sometimes possible
to identify the eﬀect of X on Y even in the presence of such a confounder. To do
29so, we want to ﬁnd a set Z located downstream of X but upstream of Y, such that
the downward ﬂow of the eﬀect of X on Y can be decomposed into the ﬂow from
X to Z, and the ﬂow from Z to Y. Clearly, in order for this to happen Z must
d-separate all front-door paths from X to Y. However, in order to make sure that
the component eﬀects P(z|do(x)) and P(y|do(z)) are themselves identiﬁable, and
combine appropriately to form P(y|do(x)), we need two additional assumptions:
there are no back-door paths from X to Z, and all back-door paths from Z
to Y are blocked by X. It turns out that these three conditions imply that
P(y|do(x)) =
P
z P(y|do(z))P(z|do(x)), and the latter two conditions further
imply that the ﬁrst term is identiﬁable by the back-door criterion and equal to
P
z P(y|z,x)P(x), while the second term is equal to P(z|x). Whenever these
three conditions hold, the eﬀect of X on Y is identiﬁable. This is known as the
front-door criterion [Pea95], [Pea00]. The front-door criterion holds in the graph
shown in Fig. 3.2 (e).
4.2 C-components and General Identiﬁcation
Unfortunately, in some graphs neither the front-door, nor the back-door criterion
hold for an outcome of interest. Yet even in such graphs we can sometimes
conclude that the eﬀect is identiﬁable. Two examples of such graphs are shown
in Fig. 3.2 (f) and (g). A general method for identifying eﬀects in such graphs
was developed in [TP02], [Tia02]. This method relies on a key graphical structure
known as a C-component.
Deﬁnition 5 (C-component) A set of nodes S is a C-component in a graph
G if any two nodes in S are connected by a path consisting entirely of bidirected
arrows in G.
30Tian showed that if a given graph G is not a C-component, it can be uniquely
partitioned into a set of maximal C-components. Moreover, the observable dis-
tribution P(v) of any causal model inducing G can be expressed as a product of
interventional distribution terms, where each term corresponds to a C-component,
and all such terms are identiﬁable. This property is known as C-component fac-
torization of causal models.
As an example, the graph in Fig. 3.2 (f) is partitioned into two C-components,
the ﬁrst is the set {X,Z2}, and the second is the set {Z1,Y }. Moreover, P(v) =
Pz1,y(x,z2)Px,z2(z1,y), and both Pz1,y(x,z2) and Px,z2(z1,y) are identiﬁable. As
we can see from this example, each term in the C-component factorization cor-
responds to the eﬀect of ﬁxing all variables outside some C-component, on all
variables inside this C-component.
C-component factorization is a powerful idea, since it allows us to decompose
a complicated identiﬁcation problem into a set of simpler ones. [TP02] used
C-components to give a general algorithm for identifying causal eﬀects which
generalizes both the back-door and the front-door criterion, and handles some
graphs which fail both of these criteria. In the subsequent sections, I give a
somewhat simpliﬁed version of Tian’s algorithm, and prove it complete. In other
words, I show that whenever the algorithm fails to identify an eﬀect in some
graph, that eﬀect is not identiﬁable in every model inducing this graph.
4.3 Simple Non-identiﬁable Eﬀects
In order to show completeness of causal eﬀect identiﬁcation, it is necessary to
catalogue non-identiﬁable graphs. The simplest such graph, known as the bow
arc graph due to its shape, is shown in Fig. 3.1 (a). The back-door criterion
31fails for this graph since the confounder node is unobservable, while the front-
door criterion fails since no intermediate variables between X and Y exist in the
graph. While the failure of these two criteria does not imply non-identiﬁcation,
a simple argument shows that P(y|do(x)) is not identiﬁable in the bow arc graph
(see Appendix).
Theorem 2 P(v),G  ⊢id P(y|do(x)) in G shown in Fig. 3.1 (a).
Since we are interested in completely characterizing graphs where a given
causal eﬀect P(y|do(x)) is identiﬁable, it would be desirable to list diﬃcult graphs
like the bow arc graph which prevent identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects, in the hope
of eventually making such a list complete and ﬁnding a way to identify eﬀects
in all graphs not on the list. I start constructing this list by considering graphs
which generalize the bow arc graph since they can contain more than two nodes,
but which also inherit its diﬃcult structure. I call such graphs C-trees.
Deﬁnition 6 (C-tree) A graph G where the set of all its nodes is a C-component,
where each node has at most one child, and all nodes are ancestors of a single
(root) node is called a C-tree.
I call a C-tree with a root node Y Y -rooted. The graphs in Fig. 3.1 (a), (d),
(e), (f), and (h) are Y -rooted C-trees. It turns out that in any Y -rooted C-tree,
the eﬀect of any subset of nodes, other than Y , on the root Y is not identiﬁable.
Theorem 3 Let G be a Y -rooted C-tree. Let X be any subset of observable nodes
in G which does not contain Y . Then P(v),G  ⊢id P(y|do(x)).
C-trees play a prominent role in the identiﬁcation of direct eﬀects. Intuitively, the
direct eﬀect of X on Y exists if there is an arrow from X to Y in the graph, and
32corresponds to the ﬂow of inﬂuence along this arrow. However, simply considering
changes in Y after ﬁxing X is insuﬃcient for isolating direct eﬀect, since X can
inﬂuence Y along other, longer front-door paths than the direct arrow. In order to
disregard such inﬂuences, I also ﬁx all other parents of Y (which as noted earlier
removes all arrows incoming to these parents and thus to Y ). The expression
corresponding to the direct eﬀect of X on Y is then P(y|do(pa(y))). The following
theorem links C-trees and direct eﬀects.
Theorem 4 P(v),G  ⊢id P(y|do(pa(y))) if and only if there exists a subgraph of
G which is a Y -rooted C-tree.
This theorem might suggest that C-trees might play an equally strong role in
identifying arbitrary eﬀects on a single variable, not just direct eﬀects. Unfortu-
nately, this turns out not to be the case, due to the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (downward extension lemma) Let V be the set of observable nodes
in G. Assume P(v),G  ⊢id P(y|do(x)). Let G′ contain all the nodes and edges
of G, and an additional node Z which is a child of all nodes in Y. Then
P(v,z),G′  ⊢id P(z|do(x)).
Proof: Let |Z| =
Q
Yi∈Y |Yi| = n. By construction, P(z|do(x)) is equal to
P
y P(z|y)P(y|do(x)). Due to the way I set the arity of Z, P(Z|Y) is an
n by n matrix which acts as a linear map which transforms P(y|do(x)) into
P(z|do(x)). Since I can arrange this linear map to be one to one, any proof
of non-identiﬁability of P(y|do(x)) immediately extends to the proof of non-
identiﬁability of P(z|do(x)). ￿
What this lemma shows is that identiﬁcation of eﬀects on a singleton is not
any simpler than the general problem of identiﬁcation of eﬀect on a set. In the








Figure 4.1: (a) a graph hedge-less for P(y|do(x)) (b) a graph containing a hedge
for P(y|do(x))
4.4 C-Forests and Hedges
To ﬁnd diﬃcult graphs which prevent identiﬁcation of eﬀects on sets, I consider
a multi-root generalization of C-trees.
Deﬁnition 7 (C-forest) A graph G where the set of all its nodes is a C-component,
and where each node has at most one child is called a C-forest.
If a given C-forest has a set of root nodes (e.g., a set of nodes with no chil-
dren) R, I call it R-rooted. Graphs in Fig. 4.1 (a), (b) are {Y 1,Y 2}-rooted
C-forests. A naive way to generalize Theorem 3 would be to state that if G is an
R-rooted C-forest, then the eﬀect of any set X that does not intersect R is not
identiﬁable. However, as I later show, this is not true. Speciﬁcally, I later prove
that P(y1,y2|do(x)) in the graph in Fig. 4.1 (a) is identiﬁable. To formulate the
correct generalization of Theorem 3, we must understand what made C-trees dif-
ﬁcult for the purposes of identifying eﬀects on the root Y . It turned out that for
particular function choices, the eﬀects of ancestors of Y on Y precisely canceled
themselves out so even though Y itself was dependent on its parents, it was obser-
vationally indistinguishable from a constant function. To get the same canceling
of eﬀects with C-forests, we must deﬁne a more complex graphical structure.
34Deﬁnition 8 (hedge) Let X,Y be sets of variables in G. Let F,F ′ be R-rooted
C-forests in G such that F ′ is a subgraph of F, X only occur in F, and R ∈
An(Y)Gx. Then F and F ′ form a hedge for P(y|do(x)).
The graph in Fig. 4.1 (b) contains a hedge for P(y1,y2|do(x)). The mental
picture for a hedge is as follows. We start with a C-forest F ′. Then, F ′ grows new
branches, while retaining the same root set, and becomes F. Finally, we “trim
the hedge,” by performing the action do(x) which has the eﬀect of removing some
incoming arrows in F \F ′ (the subgraph of F consisting of vertices not a part of
F ′). Note that any Y -rooted C-tree and its root node Y form a hedge. The right
generalization of Theorem 3 can be stated on hedges.
Theorem 5 Let F,F ′ be subgraphs of G which form a hedge for P(y|do(x)).
Then P(v),G  ⊢id P(y|do(x)).
Proof outline: As before, assume binary variables. I let the causal mechanisms
of one of the models consists entirely of bit parity functions. The second model
also computes bit parity for every mechanism, except those nodes in F ′ which
have parents in F ignore the values of those parents. It turns out that these two
models are observationally indistinguishable. Furthermore, any intervention in
F \ F ′ will break the bit parity circuits of the models. This break will be felt at
the root set R of the ﬁrst model, but not of the second, by construction. ￿
4.5 A Complete Identiﬁcation Algorithm
Unlike the bow arc graph, and C-trees, hedges prevent identiﬁcation of eﬀects on
multiple variables at once. Certainly a complete list of all possible diﬃcult graphs
must contain structures like hedges. But are there other kinds of structures that
35function ID(y, x, P, G)
INPUT: x,y value assignments, P a probability distribution,
G a causal diagram.
OUTPUT: Expression for Px(y) in terms of P or FAIL(F,F’).
1 if x = ∅ return
P
v\y P(v).
2 if V \ An(Y)G  = ∅
return ID(y,x ∩ An(Y)G,
P
v\An(Y)G P,GAn(Y)).
3 let W = (V \ X) \ An(Y)Gx.
if W  = ∅, return ID(y,x ∪ w,P,G).





i ID(si,v \ si,P,G).
if C(G \ X) = {S}
5 if C(G) = {G}, throw FAIL(G,G ∩ S).














Figure 4.2: A complete identiﬁcation algorithm. FAIL propagates through re-
cursive calls like an exception, and returns the hedge which witnesses non-iden-
tiﬁability. V
(i−1)
π is the set of nodes preceding Vi in some topological ordering π
in G.
36present problems? It turns out that the answer is “no,” any time an eﬀect is not
identiﬁable in a causal model (if we make no restrictions on the type of function
that can appear), there is a hedge structure involved. To prove that this is so,
we need an algorithm which can identify any causal eﬀect lacking a hedge. This
algorithm, which I call ID, and which can be viewed as a simpliﬁed version of
the identiﬁcation algorithm due to [Tia02], appears in Fig. 4.2.
I will explain why each line of ID makes sense, and conclude by showing the
operation of the algorithm on an example. The formal proof of soundness of ID
can be found in the appendix. The ﬁrst line merely asserts that if no action has
been taken, the eﬀect on Y is just the marginal of the observational distribution
P(v) on Y. The second line states that if we are interested in the eﬀect on Y,
it is suﬃcient to restrict our attention on the parts of the model ancestral to Y.
One intuitive argument for this is that descendants of Y can be viewed as “noisy
versions” of Y and so any information they may impart which may be helpful
for identiﬁcation is already present in Y. On the other hand, variables which
are neither ancestors nor descendants of Y lie outside the relevant causal chain
entirely, and have no useful information to contribute.
Line 3 forces an action on any node where such an action would have no eﬀect
on Y – assuming we already acted on X. Since actions remove incoming arrows,
we can view line 3 as simplifying the causal graph we consider by removing certain
arcs from the graph, without aﬀecting the overall answer. Line 4 is the key line of
the algorithm, it decomposes the problem into a set of smaller problems using the
key property of C-component factorization of causal models. If the entire graph
is a single C-component already, further problem decomposition is impossible,
and we must provide base cases. ID has three base cases. Line 5 fails because






Figure 4.3: Subgraphs of G used for identifying Px(y1,y2).
contain any X nodes. But that is exactly one of the properties of C-forests that
make up a hedge. In fact, it turns out that it is always possible to recover a hedge
from these two c-components.
Line 6 asserts that if there are no bidirected arcs from X to the other nodes
in the current subproblem under consideration, then we can replace acting on
X by conditioning, and thus solve the subproblem. Line 7 is the most complex
case where X is partitioned into two sets, W which contain bidirected arcs into
other nodes in the subproblem, and Z which do not. In this situation, identifying
P(y|do(x)) from P(v) is equivalent to identifying P(y|do(w)) from P(V|do(z)),
since P(y|do(x)) = P(y|do(w),do(z)). But the term P(V|do(z)) is identiﬁable
using the previous base case, so we can consider the subproblem of identifying
P(y|do(w)).
I give an example of the operation of the algorithm by identifying Px(y1,y2)
from P(v) in the graph shown in in Fig. 4.1 (a). Since G = GAn({Y1,Y2}),C(G \
{X}) = {G}, and W = {W1}, I invoke line 3 and attempt to identify Px,w(y1,y2).
Now C(G \ {X,W}) = {Y1,W2 → Y2}, so I invoke line 4. Thus the origi-
nal problem reduces to identifying
P
w2 Px,w1,w2,y2(y1)Pw,x,y1(w2,y2). Solving for
the second expression, I trigger line 2, noting that we can ignore nodes which
are not ancestors of W2 and Y2, which means Pw,x,y1(w2,y2) = P(w2,y2). Solv-
ing for the ﬁrst expression, I ﬁrst trigger line 2 also, obtaining Px,w1,w2,y2(y1) =
Px,w(y1). The corresponding G is shown in Fig. 4.3 (a). Next, I trigger line
7, reducing the problem to computing Pw(y1) from P(Y1|X,W1)P(W1). The
38corresponding G is shown in Fig. 4.3 (b). Finally, I trigger line 2, obtain-
ing Pw(y1) =
P






As mentioned earlier, whenever the algorithm fails at line 5, it is possible to
recover a hedge from the C-components S and G considered for the subproblem
where the failure occurs. In fact, it can be shown that this hedge implies the
non-identiﬁability of the original query with which the algorithm was invoked,
which implies the following result.
Theorem 6 ID is complete.
The completeness of ID implies that hedges can be used to characterize all
cases where eﬀects of the form P(y|do(x)) cannot be identiﬁed from the obser-
vational distribution P(v).
Theorem 7 (hedge criterion) P(v),G  ⊢id P(y|do(x)) if and only if G con-
tains a hedge for some P(y′|do(x′)), where y′ ⊆ y, x′ ⊆ x.
4.6 Conditional Eﬀects
I close this chapter by considering identiﬁcation of conditional eﬀects of the form
P(y|do(x),z) which are deﬁned to be equal to P(y,z|do(x))/P(z|do(x)). Such
expressions are a formalization of an intuitive notion of “eﬀect of action in the
presence of non-contradictory evidence,” for instance the eﬀect of smoking on
lung cancer incidence rates in a particular age group (as opposed to the eﬀect
of smoking on cancer in the general population). I say that evidence z is non-
contradictory since it is conceivable to consider questions where the evidence z








Figure 4.4: (a) Causal graph with an identiﬁable conditional eﬀect P(y|do(x),z)
(b) Causal graph with a non-identiﬁable conditional eﬀect P(y|do(x),z)
instance what is the eﬀect of smoking on cancer among the non-smokers. Such
counterfactual questions will be considered in the next chapter. Conditioning can
both help and hinder identiﬁability. P(y|do(x)) is not identiﬁable in the graph
shown in Fig. 4.4 (a), while it is identiﬁable in the graph shown in Fig. 4.4 (b).
Conditioning reverses the situation. In Fig. 4.4 (a), conditioning on Z renders Y
independent of any changes to X, making Px(y|z) equal to P(y|z). On the other
hand, in Fig. 4.4 (b), conditioning on Z makes X and Y dependent, resulting in
Px(y|z) becoming non-identiﬁable.
I would like to reduce the problem of identifying conditional eﬀects to the
familiar problem of identifying causal eﬀects without evidence for which I already
have a complete algorithm. Fortunately, rule 2 of do-calculus provides me with a
convenient way of converting the unwanted evidence z into actions do(x) which
I know how to handle. The following convenient lemma allows me to remove as
many evidence variables as possible from a conditional eﬀect.
Theorem 8 For any G and any conditional eﬀect Px(y|w) there exists a unique
maximal set Z = {Z ∈ W|Px(y|w) = Px,z(y|w\{z})} such that rule 2 applies to
Z in G for Px(y|w). In other words, Px(y|w) = Px,z(y|w \ z).
Of course Theorem 8 does not guarantee that the entire set z can be handled
in this way. In many cases, even after rule 2 is applied, some set of evidence will
40function IDC(y, x, z, P, G)
INPUT: x,y,z value assignments, P a probability
distribution, G a causal diagram (an I-map of P).
OUTPUT: Expression for Px(y|z) in terms of P or FAIL(F,F’).
1 if (∃Z ∈ Z)(Y ⊥ Z|X,Z \ {Z})Gx,z,
return IDC(y,x ∪ {z},z \ {z},P,G).




Figure 4.5: A complete identiﬁcation algorithm for conditional eﬀects.
remain in the expression. Fortunately, the following result implies that identiﬁ-
cation of unconditional causal eﬀects is all we need.
Theorem 9 Let Z ⊆ W be the maximal set such that Px(y|w) = Px,z(y|w \ z).
Then Px(y|w) is identiﬁable in G if and only if Px,z(y,w\z) is identiﬁable in G.
The previous two theorems suggest a simple addition to ID, which I call IDC,
shown in Fig. 4.5, which handles identiﬁcation of conditional causal eﬀects.
Theorem 10 IDC is sound and complete.
Proof: This follows from Theorems 8 and 9. ￿
[Tia04] developed a signiﬁcantly more complicated algorithm for identifying
conditional eﬀects. It can be shown, nevertheless, that Tian’s algorithm is in
some sense equivalent to IDC since it is complete [Shp07].
I conclude this section by noting that since the IDC algorithm uses d-separation
tests to remove conditioning variables, and since the ID algorithm it uses as a
41subroutine has a graphical condition characterizing the input graphs on which
it succeeds, it is possible to derive a complete graphical criterion for identiﬁable
conditional eﬀects.
Corollary 2 (back-door hedge criterion) Let Z ⊆ W be the unique maximal
set such that Px(y|w) = Px,z(y|w\z). Then Px(y|w) is identiﬁable from P if and
only if there does not exist a hedge for Px′(y′), for any Y
′ ⊆ (Y ∪ W) \ Z,
X
′ ⊆ X ∪ Z.
The name ’back-door hedge’ comes from the fact that both back-door paths
and hedge structures are key for identiﬁability of conditional eﬀects. In particular,
Px(y|w) is identiﬁable if and only if Px,z(y,w \ z) does not contain any hedges
and every W ∈ W\Z has a back-door path to some Y ∈ Y in the context of the
eﬀect.
4.7 Corollaries
I conclude this section by showing that the notion of a causal theory as a set of
independencies embodied by the causal graph, together with rules of probability
and do-calculus is complete for computing causal eﬀects, if we also take statistical
data embodied by P(v) as axiomatic.
Theorem 11 The rules of do-calculus are complete for identifying eﬀects of the
form P(y|do(x),z), where x,y,z are arbitrary sets.
Proof: The proofs of soundness of ID and IDC in the appendix use do-calculus.
This implies every line of the algorithms I presented can be rephrased as a se-
quence of do-calculus manipulations. But ID and IDC are also complete, which
implies the conclusion. ￿
42CHAPTER 5
Counterfactuals
In this chapter, I consider the problem of inferring distributions over atomic coun-
terfactual events from the results of all possible experiments we can perform. I
approach this problem in the same spirit I approached the problem of identifying
causal eﬀects from the previous chapter. First, I propose a graphical represen-
tation called the counterfactual graph for displaying causal assumptions involved
in multiple hypothetical worlds mentioned in counterfactual queries. With such
a representation, it’s not a diﬃcult matter to construct an identiﬁcation algo-
rithm along similar lines as the algorithm in the previous chapter. To prove
completeness, I construct the set of diﬃcult counterfactual graphs which imply
non-identiﬁcation of certain counterfactuals.
5.1 Counterfactuals and Multiple Worlds
While eﬀects of actions have an intuitive interpretation as downward ﬂow, the
interpretation of counterfactuals, or what-if questions is more complex. An in-
formal counterfactual statement in natural language such as “would I have a
headache had I taken an aspirin” talks about multiple worlds: the actual world,
and other, hypothetical worlds which diﬀer in some small respect from the actual
world (e.g., the aspirin was taken), while in most other respects are the same. In





Figure 5.1: (a) A causal graph for the aspirin/headache domain (b) A corre-
sponding twin network graph for the query P(H∗
a∗=true|A = false).
devoid of any interventions, while the alternative worlds are represented by sub-
models Mx where the action do(x) implements the hypothetical change from the
actual state of aﬀairs considered. People make sense of informal statements in-
volving multiple, possibly conﬂicting worlds because they expect not only the
causal rules to be invariant across these worlds (e.g., aspirin helps headaches in
all worlds), but the worlds themselves to be similar enough where evidence in one
world has ramiﬁcations in another. For instance, if I ﬁnd myself with a headache,
I expect the usual causes of my headache to also operate in the hypothetical
world, interacting there with the preventative inﬂuence of aspirin. In the repre-
sentation of counterfactuals used in this thesis, I model this interaction between
worlds by assuming that the world histories or background contexts, represented
by the unobserved U variables are shared across all hypothetical worlds.
I illustrate the representation method for counterfactuals I introduced in Sec-
tion 2 by modeling the example question “would I have a headache had I taken
an aspirin?” The actual world referenced by this query is represented by a causal
model containing two variables, headache and aspirin, with aspirin being a par-
ent of headache, see Fig. 5.1 (a). In this world, I observe that aspirin has value
false. The hypothetical world is represented by a submodel where the action
do(aspirin = true) has been taken. To distinguish nodes in this world I augment
44their names with an asterisk. The two worlds share the background variables U,
and so can be represented by a single causal model with the graph shown in Fig.
5.1 (b). The query is represented by the distribution P(H∗
a∗=true|A = false),
where H is headache, and A is aspirin. Note that the nodes A∗ = true and
A = false in Fig. 5.1 (b) do not share a bidirected arc. This is because an
intervention do(a∗ = true) removes all incoming arrows to A∗, which removes the
bidirected arc between A∗ and A.
5.2 Evaluating Counterfactuals
The graphs representing two hypothetical worlds invoked by a counterfactual
query like the one shown in Fig. 5.1 (b) are called twin network graphs, and were
ﬁrst proposed as a way to represent counterfactuals by [BP94b], and [BP94a]. In
addition, [BP94b] proposed a method for evaluating counterfactual expressions
like P(H∗
a∗=true|A = false) when all parameters of a causal model are known.
This method can be explained as follows. If we forget the causal and counterfac-
tual meaning behind the twin network graph, and simply view it as a Bayesian
network, the query P(H∗
a∗=true|A = false) can be evaluated using any of the
standard inference algorithms available, provided we have access to all condi-
tional probability tables generated by F and U of a causal model which gave
rise to the twin network graph. In practice, however, complete knowledge of the
model is too much to ask for; the functional relationships as well as the distribu-
tion P(u) are not known exactly, though some of their aspects can be inferred
from the observable distribution P(v).
Instead, the typical state of knowledge of a causal domain is the statistical
behavior of the observable variables in the domain, summarized by the distribu-
tion P(v), together with knowledge of causal directionality, obtained either from
45expert judgment (e.g., we know that visiting the doctor does not make us sick,
though disease and doctor visits are highly correlated), or direct experimentation
(e.g., it’s easy to imagine an experiment which establishes that wet grass does
not cause sprinklers to turn on). I already used these two sources of knowledge in
the previous chapter as a basis for computing causal eﬀects. Nevertheless, there
are reasons to consider computing counterfactual quantities from experimental,
rather than observational studies. In general, a counterfactual can posit worlds
with features contradictory to what has actually been observed. For instance,
questions resembling the headache/aspirin question I used as an example are ac-
tually frequently asked in epidemiology in the more general form where we are
interested in estimating the eﬀect of a treatment x on the outcome variable Y
for the patients that were not treated (x′). In my notation, this is just the fa-
miliar expression P(Yx|X = x′). The problem with questions such as these is
that no experimental setup exists in which someone is both given and not given
treatment. Therefore, it makes sense to ask under what circumstances we can
evaluate such questions even if we are given as input every experiment that is
possible to perform in principle on a given causal model. In my framework the
set of all experiments is denoted as P∗, and is formally deﬁned as {Px| where x
is any set of values of X ⊆ V}. The question that I ask in this chapter, then, is
whether it is possible to identify a query P(γ|δ), where γ,δ are conjunctions of
counterfactual events (with δ possibly empty), from the graph G and the set of
all experiments P∗. I can pose the problem in this way without loss of generality
since I already developed complete methods for identifying members of P∗ from
G and P(v). This means that if for some reason using P∗ as input is not realistic
I can combine the methods which I will develop in this chapter with those in the
previous chapter to obtain identiﬁcation results for P(γ|δ) from G and P(v).
465.3 The Counterfactual Graph
Before tackling the problem of identifying counterfactual queries from experi-
ments, I extend the example in Fig. 5.1 (b) to a general graphical representation
for worlds invoked by a counterfactual query. The twin network graph is a good
ﬁrst attempt at such a representation. It is essentially a causal diagram for a
model encompassing two potential worlds. Nevertheless, the twin network graph
suﬀers from a number of problems. Firstly, it can easily come to pass that a coun-
terfactual query of interest would involve three or more worlds. For instance, we
might be interested in how likely the patient would be to have a symptom Y
given a certain dose x of drug X, assuming we know that the patient has taken
dose x′ of drug X, dose d of drug D, and we know how an intermediate symptom
Z responds to treatment d. This would correspond to the query P(yx|x′,zd,d),
which mentions three worlds, the original model M, and the submodels Md,Mx.
This problem is easy to tackle – I simply add more than two submodel graphs,
and have them all share the same U nodes. This simple generalization of the
twin network model was considered by [ASP05], and was called there the parallel
worlds graph. Fig. 5.2 shows the original causal graph and the parallel worlds
graph for γ = yx ∧ x′ ∧ zd ∧ d.
The other problematic feature of the twin network graph, which is inherited
by the parallel worlds graph, is that multiple nodes can sometimes correspond
to the same random variable. For example, in Fig. 5.2 (b), the variables Z and
Zx are represented by distinct nodes, although it’s easy to show that since Z is
not a descendant of X, Z = Zx. These equality constraints among nodes can
make the d-separation criterion misleading if not used carefully. For instance,
Yx ⊥ Dx|Z even though using d-separation in the parallel worlds graph suggests




































Figure 5.2: Nodes ﬁxed by actions denoted with an overline, signifying that all
incoming arrows are cut. (a) Original causal diagram (b) Parallel worlds graph
for P(yx|x′,zd,d) (the two nodes denoted by U are the same). (c) Counterfactual
graph for P(yx|x′,zd,d).
not faithful [SGS93] or stable [PV91], [Pea00], in other words in models where d-
separation statements in a causal diagram imply independence in a distribution,
but not vice versa. However, lack of faithfulness usually arises due to “numeric
coincidences” in the observable distribution. In this case, the lack of faithfulness
is “structural,” in a sense that it is possible to reﬁne parallel worlds graphs in such
a way that the node duplication disappears, and the attendant independencies
not captured by d-separation are captured by d-separation in reﬁned graphs.
This reﬁnement has two additional beneﬁcial side eﬀects. The ﬁrst is that by
removing node duplication, we also determine which syntactically distinct coun-
terfactual variables correspond to the same random variable. By identifying such
equivalence classes of counterfactual variables, we guarantee that syntactically
diﬀerent variables are in fact diﬀerent, and this makes it simpler to reason about
counterfactuals in order to identify them. For instance, a counterfactual P(yx,y′)
may either be non-identiﬁable or inconsistent (and so identiﬁable to equal 0), de-
pending on whether Yx and Y are the same variable. The second beneﬁt of this
reﬁnement is that resulting graphs are generally much smaller and less cluttered
48than parallel worlds graphs, and so are easier to understand. Compare, for in-
stance, the graphs in Fig. 5.2 (b) and Fig. 5.2 (c). To rid ourselves of duplicates,
we need a formal way of determining when variables from diﬀerent submodels
are in fact the same. The following lemma does this.
Lemma 2 Let M be a model inducing G containing variables α,β with the fol-
lowing properties:
• α and β have the same domain of values.
• There is a bijection f from Pa(α) to Pa(β) such that a parent γ and f(γ)
have the same domain of values.
• The functional mechanisms of α and β are the same (except whenever the
function for α uses the parent γ, the corresponding function for β uses
f(γ)).
Assume an observable variable set Z was observed to attain values z in Mx, the
submodel obtained from M by forcing another observable variable set X to attain
values x. Assume further that for each γ ∈ Pa(α), either f(γ) = γ, or γ and
f(γ) attain the same values (whether by observation or intervention). Then α
and β are the same random variable in Mx with observations z.
Proof: This follows from the fact that variables in a causal model are functionally
determined from their parents. ￿
If two distinct nodes in a causal diagram represent the same random variable,
the diagram contains redundant information, and the nodes must be merged. If
two nodes, say corresponding to Yx,Yz, are established to be the same in G, they
are merged into a single node which inherits all the children of the original two.
49These two nodes either share their parents (by induction) or their parents attain
the same values. If a given parent is shared, it becomes the parent of the new
node. Otherwise, I pick one of the parents arbitrarily to become the parent of
the new node. This operation is summarized by the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Let Mx be a submodel derived from M with set Z observed to attain
values z, such that Lemma 2 holds for α,β. Let M′ be a causal model obtained
from M by merging α,β into a new node ω, which inherits all parents and the
functional mechanism of α. All children of α,β in M′ become children of ω. Then
Mx,M′
x agree on any distribution consistent with z being observed.
Proof: This is a direct consequence of Lemma 2. ￿
The new node ω I obtain from Lemma 3 can be thought of as a new coun-
terfactual variable. As mentioned in chapter 3, such variables take the form Yx
where Y is the variable in the original causal model, and x is a subscript speci-
fying the action which distinguishes the counterfactual. Since I only merge two
variables derived from the same original, specifying Y is simple. But what about
the subscript? Intuitively, the subscript of ω contains those ﬁxed variables which
are ancestors of ω in the graph G′ of M′. Formally the subscript is w, where
W = An(ω)G′∩sub(γ), where the sub(γ) corresponds to those nodes in G′ which
correspond to subscripts in γ. Since I replaced α,β by ω, I replace any mention
of α,β in the given counterfactual query P(γ) by ω. Note that since α,β are
the same, their value assignments must be the same (say equal to y). The new
counterfactual ω inherits this assignment.
50function make-cg(G,γ)
INPUT: G a causal diagram, γ a conjunction of counterfactual events
OUTPUT: A counterfactual graph Gγ, and either a set of events γ′ s.t. P(γ′) =
P(γ) or INCONSISTENT
• Construct a submodel graph Gxi for each action do(xi) mentioned in γ.
Construct the parallel worlds graph G′ by having all such submodel graphs
share their corresponding U nodes.
• Let π be a topological ordering of nodes in G′, let γ′ := γ.
• Apply Lemmas 2 and 3, in order π, to each observable node pair α,β derived
from the same variable in G. For each α,β that are the same, do:
– Let G′ be modiﬁed as speciﬁed in Lemma 3.
– Modify γ′ by renaming all occurrences of β to α.
– If val(α)  = val(β), return G′,INCONSISTENT.
• return (G′
An(γ′),γ′), where An(γ′) is the set of nodes in G′ ancestral to nodes
corresponding to variables mentioned in γ′.
Figure 5.3: An algorithm for constructing counterfactual graphs
515.4 Constructing Counterfactual Graphs
I summarize the inductive applications of Lemma 2, and 3 by the make-cg
algorithm, which takes γ and G as arguments, and constructs a version of the
parallel worlds graph without duplicate nodes. I call the resulting structure the
counterfactual graph of γ, and denote it by Gγ. The algorithm is shown in Fig.
5.3.
There are three additional subtleties in make-cg. The ﬁrst is that if variables
Yx,Yz were judged to be the same by Lemma 2, but γ assigns them diﬀerent
values, this implies that the original set of counterfactual events γ is inconsistent,
and so P(γ) = 0. The second is that if we are interested in identiﬁability of P(γ),
we can restrict ourselves to the ancestors of γ in G′. I can justify this using the
same intuitive argument I used in Section 3 to justify Line 2 in ID. The formal
proof for line 2 I provide in the Appendix applies with little change to make-cg.
Finally, because the algorithm can make an arbitrary choice picking a parent
of ω each time Lemma 3 is applied, both the counterfactual graph G′, and the
corresponding modiﬁed counterfactual γ′ are not unique. This does not present
a problem, however, as any such graph is acceptable for our purposes.
I illustrate the operation of make-cg by showing how the graph in Fig. 5.2
(c) is derived from the graph in Fig. 5.2 (b). I start the application of Lemma
2 from the topmost observable nodes, and conclude that the node pairs Dx,D,
and Xd,X have the same functional mechanisms, and the same parent set (in
this case the parents are unobservable nodes Ud for the ﬁrst pair, and Ux for the
second). I then use Lemma 3 to obtain the graph shown in Fig. 5.4 (a). Since
the node pairs are the same, we pick the name of one of the nodes of the pair
to serve as the name of the new node. In this case, I picked D and X. Note








































Figure 5.4: Intermediate graphs used by make-cg in constructing the counter-
factual graph for P(yx|x′,zd,d) from Fig. 5.2 (b).
convention that if a merge creates a situation where an unobservable variable has
a single parent, that variable is omitted from the graph. For instance, in Fig. 5.4
(a), the variable Ud, and its corresponding arrow to D omitted.
Next, I apply Lemma 2 for the node pair Wd,W. In this case, the functional
mechanisms are once again the same, while the parents of Wd,W are X and Uw. I
can also apply Lemma 2 twice to conclude that Z,Zx and Zd are in fact the same
node, and so can be merged. The functional mechanisms of these three nodes are
the same, and they share the parent Uz. As far as the parents of this triplet, the
Uz parent is shared by all three, while Z,Zx share the parent D, and Zd has a
separate parent d, ﬁxed by intervention. However, in the counterfactual query in
question, which is P(yx|x′,zd,d), the variable D happens to be observed to attain
the value d, the same as the intervention value for the parent of Zd. This implies
that for the purposes of the Z,Zx,Zd triplet, their D-derived parents share the
same value, which allows us to conclude they are the same random variable.
The intuition here is that while intervention and observation are not the same
operation, they have the same eﬀect if the relevant U variables happen to react
in the same way to both the given intervention, and the given observation (this
is the essence of the Axiom of Composition [Pea00].) In this case, U variables
53react the same way because the parallel worlds share all unobserved variables.
There is one additional subtlety in performing the merge of the triplet Z,Zx,Zd.
If we examine the query P(yx|x′,zd,d), we notice that Zd, or more precisely its
value, appears in it. When I merge nodes, only one name out of the original two is
used. It’s possible that some of the old names appear in the query, which means
I must replace all references to the old, pre-merge nodes to the new post-merge
name I picked. Since I picked the name Z for the newly merged node, I replace
the reference to Zd in the query by the reference to Z, so the modiﬁed query is
P(yx|x′,z,d). Since the variables were established to be the same, this is a safe
syntactic transformation.
After Wd,W, and the Z,Zx,Zd triplet are merged, the resulting graph appears
in Fig. 5.4 (b). Finally, I apply Lemma 2 one more time to conclude Y and Yd are
the same variable, using the same reasoning as before. After performing this ﬁnal
merge, I obtain the graph in Fig. 5.4 (c). It’s easy to see that Lemma 2 no longer
applies to any node pair: W and Wx diﬀer in their X-derived parent, and Y , and
Yx diﬀer on their W-derived parent, which was established inductively. The ﬁnal
operation which make-cg performs is restricting the graph in Fig. 5.4 (b) to
variables actually relevant for computing the (potentially syntactically modiﬁed)
query it was given as input, namely P(yx|x′,z,d), in other words those variables
which are ancestral to variables in the query in the ﬁnal intermediate graph I
obtained. In this case, I remove nodes W and Y (and their adjacent edges) from
consideration, to ﬁnally obtain the graph in Fig. 5.2 (c), which is a counterfactual
graph for the original query.
54function ID*(G,γ)
INPUT: G a causal diagram, γ a conjunction of counterfactual events
OUTPUT: an expression for P(γ) in terms of P∗ or FAIL
1 if γ = ∅, return 1
2 if (∃xx′.. ∈ γ), return 0
3 if (∃xx.. ∈ γ), return ID*(G,γ \ {xx..})
4 (G′,γ′) = make-cg(G,γ)
5 if γ′ = INCONSISTENT, return 0







7 if C(G′) = {S} then,
8 if (∃x,x′) s.t. x  = x′,x ∈ sub(S),x′ ∈ ev(S),
throw FAIL




Figure 5.5: An identiﬁcation algorithm for joint counterfactual distributions.
55function IDC*(G,γ,δ)
INPUT: G a causal diagram, γ,δ conjunctions of counterfactual events
OUTPUT: an expression for P(γ|δ) in terms of P∗, FAIL, or UNDEFINED
1 if ID*(G,δ) = 0, return UNDEFINED
2 (G′,γ′ ∧ δ′) = make-cg(G,γ ∧ δ)
3 if γ′ ∧ δ′ = INCONSISTENT, return 0




5 else, let P ′ = ID*(G,γ′ ∧ δ′). return P ′/P ′(δ)
Figure 5.6: An identiﬁcation algorithm for conditional counterfactual distribu-
tions.
565.5 Counterfactual Identiﬁcation Algorithms
Having constructed a graphical representation of worlds mentioned in counter-
factual queries, I can turn to identiﬁcation. I construct two algorithms for this
task, the ﬁrst is called ID* and works for unconditional queries, while the sec-
ond, IDC*, works on queries with counterfactual evidence and calls the ﬁrst as
a subroutine. These are shown in Figs. 5.5 and 5.6.
These algorithms make use of the following notation: sub(.) returns the set
of subscripts, var(.) the set of variables, and ev(.) the set of values (either set or
observed) appearing in a given counterfactual, while val(.) is the value assigned
to a given counterfactual variable. As before, C(G′) is the set of maximal C-
components of G′, except I don’t count nodes in G′ ﬁxed by interventions as
part of any C-component. V (G′) is the set of observable nodes of G′. Following
[Pea00], G′
yx is the graph obtained from G′ by removing all outgoing arcs from
Yx; γ′
yx is obtained from γ′ by replacing all descendant variables Wz of Yx in γ′
by Wz,y. A counterfactual sr, where s,r are value assignments to sets of nodes,
represents the event “the node set S attains values s under intervention do(r).”
Finally, I take xx.. to mean some counterfactual variable derived from X where x
appears in the subscript (the rest of the subscript can be arbitrary), which also
attains value x.
The notation used in these algorithms is somewhat intricate, so I give an in-
tuitive description of each line. I start with ID*. The ﬁrst line states that if
γ is an empty conjunction, then its probability is 1, by convention. The second
line states that if γ contains a counterfactual which violates the Axiom of Ef-
fectiveness [Pea00], then γ is inconsistent, and I return probability 0. The third
line states that if a counterfactual contains its own value in the subscript, then
it is a tautological event, and it can be removed from γ without aﬀecting its
57probability. Line 4 invokes make-cg to construct a counterfactual graph G′, and
the corresponding relabeled counterfactual γ′. Line 5 returns probability 0 if an
inconsistency was found during the construction of the counterfactual graph, e.g.,
if two variables found to be the same in γ had diﬀerent value assignments. Line 6
is analogous to Line 4 in the ID algorithm, it decomposes the problem into a set
of subproblems, one for each C-component in the counterfactual graph. In the
ID algorithm, the term corresponding to a given C-component Si of the causal
diagram was the eﬀect of all variables not in Si on variables in Si, in other words
Pv\si(si), and the outermost summation on line 4 was over values of variables
not in Y,X. Here, the term corresponding to a given C-component Si of the
counterfactual graph G′ is the conjunction of counterfactual variables where each
variable contains in its subscript all variables not in the C-component Si, in other
words v(G′)\si, and the outermost summation is over variables not in γ′. Line 7
is the base case, where the counterfactual graph has a single C-component. There
are two cases, corresponding to line 8 and line 9. Line 8 says that if γ′ contains
a “conﬂict,” that is an inconsistent value assignment where at least one value is
in the subscript, then I fail. Line 9 says if there are no conﬂicts, then its safe to
take the union of all subscripts in γ′, and return the eﬀect of the subscripts in γ′
on the variables in γ′.
The IDC*, like its counterpart IDC is shorter. The ﬁrst line fails if δ is
inconsistent. IDC did not have an equivalent line, since I can assume P(v) is
positive. The problem with counterfactual distributions is there is no simple
way to prevent non-positive distributions spanning multiple worlds from arising,
even if the original P(v) was positive – hence the explicit check. The second
line constructs the counterfactual graph, except since make-cg can only take
conjunctions, I provide it with a joint counterfactual γ ∧ δ. Line 3 returns 0 if
an inconsistency was detected. Line 4 is the central line of the algorithm and
58is analogous to line 1 of IDC. In IDC, I moved a value assignment Z = z
from being observed to being ﬁxed if there were no back-door paths from Z to
the outcome variables Y given the context of the eﬀect of do(x). Here, I move
a counterfactual value assignment Yx = y from being observed (that is being a
part of δ), to being ﬁxed (that is appearing in every subscript of γ′) if there are
no back-door paths from Yz to the counterfactual of interest γ′. Finally, line 5
is the analogue of line 2 of IDC, we attempt to identify a joint counterfactual
probability, and then obtain a conditional counterfactual probability from the
result.
I illustrate the operation of these algorithms by considering the identiﬁcation
of the query P(yx|x′,zd,d) I mentioned earlier. Since P(x′,zd,d) is not incon-
sistent, I proceed to construct the counterfactual graph on line 2. Suppose I
produce the graph in Fig. 5.2 (c), where the corresponding modiﬁed query is
P(yx|x′,z,d). Since P(yx,x′,z,d) is not inconsistent I proceed to the next line,
which moves z,d (with d being redundant due to graph structure) to the subscript
of yx, to obtain P(yx,z|x′). Finally, I call ID* with the query P(yx,z,x′). The
ﬁrst interesting line is 6, where the query is expressed as
P
w P(yx,z,w,x′)P(wx).
Note that x is redundant in the ﬁrst term, so a recursive call reaches line 9 with
P(yz,w,x′), which is identiﬁable as Pz,w(y,x′) from P∗. The second term is triv-
ially identiﬁable as Px(w), which means the query P(yx,x′,z,d) is identiﬁable as
P ′ =
P
w Pz,w(y,x′)Px(w), and the conditional query is equal to P ′/P ′(x′).
5.6 Soundness and Completeness
The deﬁnitions of ID*, and IDC* reveal their close similarity to algorithms
ID and IDC in the previous section. The major diﬀerences lie in the failure
and success base cases, and slightly diﬀerent subscript notation. This is not a
59coincidence, since a counterfactual graph can be thought of as a causal graph for
a particular large causal model which happens to have some distinct nodes have
the same causal mechanisms. This means that all the theorems and deﬁnitions
used in the previous sections for causal diagrams transfer over without change
to counterfactual graphs. Using this fact, I will show that ID*, and IDC* are
sound and complete for identifying P(γ), and P(γ|δ) respectively.
Theorem 12 (soundness) If ID* succeeds, the expression it returns is equal to
P(γ) in a given causal graph. Furthermore, if IDC* does not output FAIL, the
expression it returns is equal to P(γ|δ) in a given causal graph, if that expression
is deﬁned, and UNDEFINED otherwise.
Proof outline: The ﬁrst line merely states that the probability of an empty con-
junction is 1, which is true by convention. Lines 2 and 3 follow by the Axiom of
Eﬀectiveness [GP98]. The soundness of make-cg has already been established,
which implies the soundness of line 4. Line 6 decomposes the problem using c-
component factorization. The soundness proof for this decomposition, also used
in the previous section, is in the appendix. Line 9 asserts that if a set of coun-
terfactual events does not contain conﬂicting value assignments to any variable,
obtained either by observation or intervention, then taking the union of all ac-
tions of the events results in a consistent action. The probability of the set of
events can then be computed from a submodel where this consistent action has
taken place. Full proof of this is in the appendix. ￿
To show completeness, I follow the same strategy I used in the previous sec-
tion. I catalogue all diﬃcult counterfactual graphs which arise from queries which
cannot be identiﬁed from P∗. I then show these graphs arise whenever ID* and
IDC* fail. This, together with the soundness theorem I already proved, implies
that these algorithms are complete.
60The simplest diﬃcult counterfactual graph arises from the query P(yx,y′
x′)
named “probability of necessity and suﬃciency” by [Pea00]. This graph, shown
in Fig. 5.1 (b) with variable relabeling, is called the “w-graph” due to its shape
[ASP05]. This query is so named because if P(yx,y′
x′) is high, this implies that
if the variable X is forced to x, variable Y is likely to be y, while if X is forced
to some other value, Y is likely to not be y. This means that the action do(x) is
likely a necessary and suﬃcient cause of Y assuming value y, up to noise. The
w-graph starts the catalogue of bad graphs with good reason, as the following
lemma shows.
Lemma 4 Assume X is a parent of Y in G. Then P∗,G  ⊢id P(yx,y′
x′),P(yx,y′)
for any value pair y,y′.
Proof: I construct two causal models M1,M2 that agree on P∗ but disagree on
the counterfactual distributions in question. In fact, I only need two variables.
The two models agree on the following: X is the parent of Y , UX, X and Y are
binary variables, UY be a ternary variable, fX = UX, and P(uX), and P(uY) are
uniform. The two models only diﬀer on the functions fY , which are given by
Table 5.6. It’s easy to verify the claim holds for the two models for any values
x∗  = x of X. ￿
The intuitive explanation for this result is that P(yx,y′
x′) is derived from
the joint distribution over the counterfactual variables in the w-graph, while if I
restrict myself to P∗, I only have access to marginal distributions – one marginal
for each possible world. Because counterfactual variables Yx and Yx′ share an
unobserved parent U, they are dependent, and their joint distribution cannot
be decomposed into a product of marginals. This means that the information
encoded in the marginals is insuﬃcient to uniquely determine the joint we are
interested in. This intuitive argument can be generalized to a counterfactual
61Table 5.1: The functions f1
Y and f2
Y
X UY Y = f1
Y (x,uY ) Y = f2
Y (x,uY )
0 1 0 1
0 2 1 1
0 3 1 0
1 1 1 1
1 2 0 0
1 3 0 0
(a)
X
Y Z W W 1 2
(b)
Y Z W W 1 2
x x’
Figure 5.7: (a) Causal diagram (b) Corresponding counterfactual graph for the
non-identiﬁable query P(Yx,W 1,W 2,Zx′).
graph with more than two nodes, the so-called “zig-zag graphs” an example of
which is shown in Fig. 5.7 (b).
Lemma 5 Assume G is such that X is a parent of Y and Z, and Y and Z
are connected by a bidirected path with observable nodes W 1,...,W k on the path.
Then P∗,G  ⊢id P(yx,w1,...,wk,zx′),P(yx,w1,...,wk,z) for any value assignments
y,w1,...,wk,z.
The w-graph in Fig. 5.1 (b) and the zig-zag graph in Fig. 5.7 (b) have very
special structure, so I don’t expect my characterization to be complete with just
these graphs. In order to continue, I must provide two lemmas which allow me
62to transform diﬃcult graphs in various ways by adding nodes and edges, while
retaining the non-identiﬁability of the underlying counterfactual from P∗.
Lemma 6 (downward extension lemma) Assume P∗,G  ⊢id P(γ).
Let {y1
x1,...,yn
xm} be a subset of counterfactual events in γ. Let G′ be a graph ob-
tained from G by adding a new child W of Y 1,...,Y n. Let γ′ = (γ\{y1
x1,...,yn
xm})∪
{wx1,...,wxm}, where w is an arbitrary value of W. Then P∗,G′  ⊢id P(γ′).
The ﬁrst result states that non-identiﬁcation on a set of parents (causes)
translates into non-identiﬁcation on children (eﬀects). The intuitive explanation
for this is that it is possible to construct a one-to-one function from the space of
distributions on causes to the space of distributions on eﬀects. If a given P(γ)
cannot be identiﬁed from P∗, this implies that there exist two models which agree
on P∗, but disagree on P(γ), where γ is a set of counterfactual causes. It is then
possible to augment these models using the one-to-one function in question to
obtain disagreement on P(δ), where δ is a set of counterfactual eﬀects of γ. A
more detailed argument is found in the appendix.
Lemma 7 (contraction lemma) Assume P∗,G  ⊢id P(γ). Let G′ be obtained
from G by merging some two nodes X,Y into a new node Z where Z inherits all
the parents and children of X,Y , subject to the following restrictions:
• The merge does not create cycles.
• If (∃ws ∈ γ) where x ∈ s, y  ∈ s, and X ∈ An(W)G, then Y  ∈ An(W)G.
• If (∃ys ∈ γ) where x ∈ s, then An(X)G = ∅.
• If (Yw,Xs ∈ γ), then w and s agree on all variable settings.
63Assume |X|×|Y | = |Z| and there’s some isomorphism f assigning value pairs
x,y to a value f(x,y) = z. Let γ′ be obtained from γ as follows. For any ws ∈ γ:
• If W  ∈ {X,Y }, and values x,y occur in s, replace them by f(x,y).
• If W  ∈ {X,Y }, and the value of one of X,Y occur in s, replace it by some
z consistent with the value of X or Y .
• If X,Y do not occur in γ, leave γ as is.
• If W = Y and x ∈ s, replace ws by f(x,y)s\{x}.
• otherwise, replace every variable pair of the form Yr = y,Xs = x by Zr,s =
f(x,y).
Then P∗,G′  ⊢id P(γ′).
This lemma has a rather complicated statement, but the basic idea is very
simple. If I have a causal model with a graph G where some counterfactual P(γ)
is not identiﬁable, then a coarser, more “near-sighted” view of G which merges
two distinct variables with their own mechanisms into a single variable with a
single mechanism will not render P(γ) identiﬁable. This is because merging nodes
in the graph does not alter the model, but only our state of knowledge of the
model. Therefore, whatever model pair was used to prove P(γ) non-identiﬁable
will remain the same in the new, coarser graph. The complicated statement
of the lemma is due to the fact that I cannot allow arbitrary node merges, I
must satisfy certain coherence conditions. For instance, the merge cannot create
directed cycles in the graph.
It turns out that whenever ID* fails on P(γ), the corresponding counterfac-
tual graph contains a subgraph which can be obtained by a set of applications of
64the previous two lemmas to the w-graph and the zig-zag graphs. This allows an
argument that shows P(γ) cannot be identiﬁed from P∗.
Theorem 13 (completeness) If ID* or IDC* fail, then the corresponding
query is not identiﬁable from P∗.
5.7 Corollaries
Since ID* is complete for P(γ) queries, I can give a graphical characterization
of counterfactual graphs where P(γ) cannot be identiﬁed from P∗.
Theorem 14 Let Gγ,γ′ be obtained from make-cg(G,γ). Then P∗,G  ⊢id P(γ)
iﬀ there exists a C-component S ⊆ An(γ′)Gγ where some X ∈ Pa(S) is set to x
while at the same time either X is also a parent of another node in S and is set
to another value x′, or S contains a variable derived from X which is observed
to be x′.
Proof: This follows from Theorem 13 and the construction of ID*. ￿
65CHAPTER 6
Path-speciﬁc Eﬀects
In this chapter, I consider the problem of identifying path-speciﬁc eﬀects. I show
how path-speciﬁc eﬀects, though understood to be causal eﬀects along a sub-
set of causal paths nevertheless can be represented using nested counterfactual
variables. I will use this representation to express every path-speciﬁc eﬀect in
terms of counterfactual distributions considered in Chapter 5, and give complete
graphical conditions for identifying these distributions in graphs without bidi-
rected arcs. Furthermore, I will use the results on counterfactual identiﬁcation
found in Chapter 5 to give a powerful identiﬁcation condition for path-speciﬁc
eﬀects in graphs with bidirected arcs as well. 1
6.1 Natural Eﬀects
Consider the study of UC Berkeley’s alleged gender bias in admissions, as de-
scribed in [PJ75], and Chapter 4 of [Pea00]. This case was interesting since
the data “paradoxically” showed males were more likely to be admitted overall,
while each department was more likely to admit females. Let’s assume the causal
diagram in Fig. 6.1 (a) is a coarse (but correct) representation of the admis-
sion situation: the applicants’ gender inﬂuences their life goals, these goals along
with their gender shape their decisions to apply at particular departments, while









Figure 6.1: Causal diagram for the Berkeley discrimination domain (adopted
from [Pea00]).
each department has its own admission procedure which incorporates the appli-
cant competence (an unmeasured confounder between goals and admission), and
possibly gender itself. To exonerate the university, we must show that the link
between gender and admission is in some sense vacuous, in which case admission
decisions are not based directly on gender. In other words, we must show that
the admission decision would have stayed the same had gender been diﬀerent,
but everything else stayed the same.
[Pea01] introduces a special subscript notation to represent such hypothetical
questions. Speciﬁcally, Yx,Zx∗(u) is taken to mean the value achieved by Y when
the background variables achieve values u, we ﬁx X to x, and Z to whatever
value it would have attained when X is ﬁxed to x∗. If we are uncertain about
the values of u, we have to deal with Yx,Zx∗ as a random variable. In such cases,
there is no unique value z in the subscript. Instead, we must average over all
possible value assignments to Z. In other words, P(Yx,Zx∗) is a shorthand for
P
z P(Yx,z,Zx∗ = z).
In the model, we are interested in the probability
P
d P(admissiongender=male,department=d,departmentgender=female = d), which is the
probability of admission of a male given that all other known causes of admission
assumed values consistent with being female. One way to describe this proba-
67bility is as a direct eﬀect of gender on admissions. In Chapter 4, I deﬁned the
direct eﬀect of X on Y by considering how do(x) aﬀects Y , when all other par-
ents W of Y are ﬁxed to speciﬁc values w. The sort of direct eﬀect I discuss
here, where we average over possible parent settings under a setting of X to a
default value x∗ is called natural direct eﬀect in [Pea01]. Aside from being a more
faithful formalization of the intuitive quantity relevant to discrimination cases,
natural direct eﬀects have another advantage over conventional direct eﬀects –
they allow a symmetric deﬁnition of an intuitive deﬁnition of “indirect eﬀects.”
In the discrimination case, an indirect eﬀect would correspond to all ways gender
can inﬂuence admission – except any direct inﬂuence. The conventional direct
eﬀect deﬁnition cannot be extended to handle indirect eﬀects, however natural
eﬀects easily express indirect eﬀects by merely changing reference values. For in-
stance the indirect eﬀect of being male on admission would be represented by the
expression
P
d P(admissiongender=female,department=d,departmentgender=male = d).
I can represent natural eﬀects graphically by marking “forbidden” edges whose
parents behave as if the control variable was set to a reference value. For instance,
Fig. 6.1 (b) represents the natural direct eﬀect of gender on admission, so the edge
from department to admission is crossed out. Being able to “forbid” arbitrary
paths when considering causal eﬀects is a powerful notion, which comes up in
situations other than discrimination.
6.2 An Example of Path-speciﬁc Eﬀect
Consider the following example, inspired by [Rob97]. A study is performed on the
eﬀects of the AZT drug on AIDS patients. AZT is a harsh drug known to cause
a variety of complications. For the purposes of the model, I restrict my attention





Figure 6.2: Causal model for the AZT domain.
with antibiotics, and severe headache suﬀerers can take painkillers. Ultimately,
all the above variables, except headache, are assumed to have a direct eﬀect on
the survival chances of the patient. The graphical causal model for this situation
is shown in Fig. 6.2.
Say we are interested in the interactions between antibiotics and AZT that
negatively aﬀect survival. To study such interactions, we might consider the eﬀect
of administering AZT on survival in the idealized situation where the antibiotics
variable behaved as if AZT was not administered, and compare this to the eﬀect
of AZT on survival (where side eﬀects are present). Graphically this amounts
to “forbidding” the direct edge between antibiotics and survival. This is shown
graphically in Fig. 6.3 (a). Similarly, the path-speciﬁc eﬀect in Fig. 6.3 (b)
represents the idealized situation where AZT has no side-eﬀects on painkiller
medication.
6.3 Counterfactual Deﬁnition of Path-Speciﬁc Eﬀects
Path-speciﬁc eﬀects in a model M as they were deﬁned in Chapter 3, and in
[Pea01], are really total eﬀects in a causal model M∗ modiﬁed from the original
by replacing certain causal mechanisms. It is awkward to use this deﬁnition
directly if we are interested in identifying path-speciﬁc eﬀects, since my arguments
69If we are uncertain about the values u of background nodes, nested counterfac-
tual variables, like their ordinary counterparts, become random variables. Since
writing Yx,z1,...,zk(u) is equivalent to writing Yx,Z1
..(u),...,Zk
..(u)(u), by deﬁnition, I
will use the notation P(Yx,Z1
..,...,Zk





..(u)(u)=y} P(u). Note that variables Zi
.. may them-
selves involve nested subscripts, so the overall expression may be quite diﬃcult
to write.
The following lemma shows how nested counterfactual random variables can







.. = zk), where
Zi
.. = zi stands for the event “nested counterfactual variable Zi
.. assumes values
zi.”
I can use Lemma 8 to express every nested counterfactual in terms of joint
probability distributions over ordinary counterfactual variables.
Theorem 15 Let Yx,Z1
..,...,Zk
.. be a nested counterfactual variable (with Z1
..,...,Zk
..
nested counterfactual variables as well). For every nested counterfactual vari-
able Wm,S1
..,...,Sk
.. used in the inductive deﬁnition of Yx,Z1
..,...,Zk
.., let Wm,s1,...,sk be the











m,s1,...,sk), where the index i ranges over all
“unrolled” ordinary counterfactuals attained from nested counterfactuals which
occur in Yx,Z1
..,...,Zk






This result shows that nested counterfactuals are quantities obtainable from
joint distributions over ordinary counterfactual variables. What I now show is
71that every path-speciﬁc eﬀect of a single variable X on another single variable Y is
expressible as a nested counterfactual, and thus as a counterfactual distribution.
Theorem 16 Let g be a subset of “allowed edges.” Let Yx(u) − Yx∗(u) be a
path-speciﬁc eﬀect in Mg. Then both (sets of) random variables Yx,Yx∗ can be
expressed in terms of a nested counterfactual in the original model M.
Corollary 3 Let g be a subset of “allowed edges.” Let Yx(u) − Yx∗(u) be a
path-speciﬁc eﬀect in Mg. Then both (sets of) random variables Yx,Yx∗ can be
expressed in terms of counterfactual distributions in the original model M.
6.4 Eﬀect-invariant Transformations
Path-speciﬁc eﬀects have two complementary representations, as quantities de-
rived from counterfactual distributions, and as marked graphs. The marked graph
representation is by far the more intuitive, so it would be preferable to operate
on graphs rather than distributions. In this section, I introduce three rules which
allow us to make changes to the marked graphs without aﬀecting either the value
or the identiﬁability of the corresponding path-speciﬁc eﬀect. Systematic ap-
plication of these three rules will allow me to derive a complete identiﬁcation
condition for path-speciﬁc eﬀects of a single variable X on a single outcome Y in
Markovian graphs (that is, graphs without bidirected arcs).
Deﬁnition 10 (rule 1) Rule 1 applies to a marked graph Gg at V if all arrows
outgoing from V which start directed paths from V to Y are forbidden. The
marked graph GRv
1(g) obtained from Gg by the application of rule 1 forbids all
incoming arrows to V and allows all previously marked outgoing arrows from V ,
leaving the status of other edges unchanged. See Fig. 6.4.
72The important invariant with path-speciﬁc eﬀects is the set of all allowed
paths, that is paths consisting only of allowed edges, from X to Y , and this set is
not changed by the application of rule 1, since any path which contains a newly
forbidden edge incoming to V must have had a forbidden edge leaving V .
Deﬁnition 11 (rule 2) Rule 2 applies to a marked graph Gg at V if there is a
forbidden edge e leaving V , and all directed paths from X to V contain forbidden
edges. The marked graph GRv
2(g) obtained from Gg by the application of rule 2
allows the formerly forbidden edge e, leaving the status of other edges unchanged.
See Fig. 6.5.
Rule 2 also preserves the set of all allowed paths since any path containing
the newly allowed edge e cannot be an allowed path.
Deﬁnition 12 (rule 3) Rule 3 applies to a marked graph Gg at V if there is
a forbidden edge e entering V , and V  ∈ An(Y ), or there is a forbidden edge e
leaving V , and V  ∈ De(X). The marked graph GRv
3(g) obtained from Gg by the
application of rule 3 allows the formerly forbidden edge e, leaving the status of
other edges unchanged. See Fig. 6.6.
I want to prove a result which will lets us conclude that arbitrary changes
of the marked graph using rules 1, 2, and 3 do not change the underlying path-
speciﬁc eﬀect. To prove this, I need one utility lemma.
Lemma 9 Let V.. be a nested counterfactual where all constant subscripts are the
same and equal to x. Then V.. = Vx.
Proof: This follows by deﬁnition of nested counterfactuals. ￿
73V V







Figure 6.5: Rule 2 (marked thick arrows correspond to forbidden directed paths).
Theorem 17 If rule 1 applies to Gg at V , then the path-speciﬁc eﬀect in Gg is
equal to the path-speciﬁc eﬀect in GRv
1(g). If rule 2 applies to Gg at V , then the
path-speciﬁc eﬀect in Gg is equal to the path-speciﬁc eﬀect in GRv
2(g). If rule 3
applies to Gg at V , then the path-speciﬁc eﬀect in Gg is equal to the path-speciﬁc
eﬀect in GRv
3(g).
Since R1 moves forbidden edges closer to the manipulated variables and R2,R3
remove redundant forbidden edges, it is not surprising that these two rules cannot





Figure 6.6: Rule 3
74Lemma 10 Let Gg be a marked graph. Then rules 1, 2 and 3 can only be applied
ﬁnitely many times.
6.5 Completeness for Single-Source Single-Outcome Path-
speciﬁc Eﬀects
I will use the two rules deﬁned in the previous section to obtain a completeness
result for identiﬁcation of path-speciﬁc eﬀects from a single variable X to a single
outcome Y in Markovian graphs. The general strategy will be similar to that
used in the previous chapters. I will show that a particular, simple kind of
counterfactual distribution is not identiﬁable, and then show that this distribution
arises in all marked graphs of a certain form. I will then repeatedly use the two
rules to reduce a given marked graph to a form where identiﬁcation becomes
simple to establish.
I start with a non-identiﬁable counterfactual distribution which already made
an appearance in Chapter 5.
Lemma 4 Assume X is a parent of Y in G. Then P∗,G  ⊢id P(yx,y′
x′),P(yx,y′)
for any value pair y,y′.
The next theorem shows how a particular path-speciﬁc eﬀect leads to prob-
lematic counterfactuals from the previous lemma.
Theorem 18 The g-speciﬁc eﬀect of Z on Y as described in Fig. 6.7 (a) is not
P∗-identiﬁable.
It turns out that anytime a path-speciﬁc eﬀect of X on Y is not identiﬁable,
the corresponding marked graph looks similar to the graph in Fig. 6.7 (a), in
75Theorem 19 Assume Gg is a marked graph with a single source X and a single
outcome Y , such that rules 1,2, and 3 do not apply. Then either Gg satisﬁes the
recanting witness criterion, or all marked edges emanate from X.
What I have left to show is that the kite graph always results in a non-
identiﬁable path-speciﬁc eﬀect, and a graph where all marked nodes leave X
results in an identiﬁable path-speciﬁc eﬀect.
Theorem 20 Assume rules 1, 2, and 3 do not apply to Gg, and Gg satisﬁes
the recanting witness criterion. Then the g-speciﬁc eﬀect of X on Y is not P∗-
identiﬁable.
Theorem 21 If rules 1, 2, and 3 do not apply to Gg and all marked arrows
emanate from X, then the path-speciﬁc eﬀect of X on Y along g is identiﬁable
in Markovian models.
6.6 General Path-speciﬁc Eﬀects
In the previous section, I developed a complete characterization of identiﬁable
path-speciﬁc eﬀects from a single source X to a single outcome Y in terms of
marked Markovian graphs. It turns out that it is possible to generalize the graph-
ical condition developed in the previous section for the case of multiple sources
and multiple outcomes. Unfortunately, if the marked graph is semi-Markovian,
there is no longer a straightforward graphical representation of identiﬁable path-
speciﬁc eﬀects, since individual counterfactuals in the counterfactual distribution
representation of path-speciﬁc eﬀects are no longer independent. However, I can
use the results I developed in Chapter 5 to give identiﬁcation conditions in this
77more general setting as well, although such conditions are not necessarily com-
plete.
First, I need to generalize distributions over a single nested counterfactual to
range over multiple such counterfactuals.
Deﬁnition 14 (nested counterfactual distributions) Let Y 1
.. ,...Y k
.. be a set
of nested counterfactual variables. Then I deﬁne P(Y 1
.. = y1,...,Y k






It turns out that I can generalize Theorem 15 to show that every nested coun-
terfactual distribution can be expressed in terms of distributions over ordinary
counterfactual variables.
Theorem 22 P(Y 1
.. = y1,...,Y k





..), where the index i ranges
over all “unrolled” ordinary counterfactuals attained from nested counterfactuals
which occur in Y 1
.. ,...,Y k
.. , and s is the set of values attained by all nested coun-
terfactuals in Y 1
.. ,...,Y k
.. , except those in the set {Y 1
.. ,...,Y k
.. }.
Proof: The proof is a straightforward generalization of the proof of Theorem 15.
￿
If I restrict myself to Markovian graphs, I need not reason on the level of
counterfactual distributions, but can deal instead with marked graphs, as in the
previous section. However, I need to generalize the three graph transformation
rules I used to work in the multi-source multi-outcome setting. It turns out that
rule 1 carries over to this setting without changes, while rules 2 and 3 merge into
a new rule.
Deﬁnition 15 (unmarking rule) The unmarking rule applies to a marked graph
Gg at a marked edge e emanating from node V if either there are no allowed di-
78rected paths from X to V , or V  ∈ An(Y). The marked graph GRe
4(g) obtained
from Gg by the application of the unmarking rule allows the formerly forbidden
edge e, leaving the status of other edges unchanged.
As with the other rules, applications of the unmarking rule are “safe,” in the
sense that the path-speciﬁc eﬀect is preserved.
Theorem 23 If the unmarking rule applies to Gg at e, then path-speciﬁc eﬀect
in Gg is equal to the path-speciﬁc eﬀect in GRe
4(g).
As before, rule 1, and the unmarking rule can only be applied ﬁnitely many
times in a given marked graph, and if they can no longer be applied, the resulting
graph will be in one of two forms. The ﬁrst form will generalize the “kite graph”
from the previous section, while in the second form all marked edges emanate
from X.
Theorem 24 Assume Gg is a marked graph, we are interested in a g-speciﬁc
eﬀect of X on Y, and neither rule 1, nor the unmarking rule are applicable to
Gg. Then either all marked edges emanate from nodes in X, or there is a node
R such that there is an allowed directed path from X to R, an allowed directed
path from R to Y, and a forbidden directed path from R to Y. See Fig. 6.8.
What remains to show is that the ﬁrst form, corresponding to the generalized
kite graph always results in a non-identiﬁable path-speciﬁc eﬀect, while the second
form results in identiﬁable path-speciﬁc eﬀects in Markovian graphs.
Theorem 25 Assume Gg contains the patterns shown in Fig. 6.8. Then the
g-speciﬁc eﬀect of X on Y is not P∗-identiﬁable.
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Figure 6.8: The generalized kite graph (Y1,Y2 may be the same node). Thick
arrows correspond to directed paths.
Theorem 26 Assume all marked arrows emanate from X in Gg. Then the path-
speciﬁc eﬀect of X on Y is identiﬁable in Markovian models.
Having established a complete condition for identiﬁcation of path-speciﬁc ef-
fects with multiple sources and multiple outcomes in Markovian graphs, we turn
to the semi-Markovian case. Unfortunately, while most of the reasoning carries
over without change, I can no longer establish independence of each counterfac-
tual term, as in the proof of the Theorem 26. This means that there is no longer
a complete condition for identiﬁcation which can be expressed in a straightfor-
ward way using the marked graph. However, I can use the results developed in
Chapter 5 to obtain a condition for identiﬁcation using the ID
∗ algorithm.
Corollary 4 Let Gg be a marked graph, X the set of sources, Y the set of out-
comes. Let P ′ be the counterfactual distribution corresponding to a path-speciﬁc
eﬀect of X on Y due to Corollary 3. Then the path-speciﬁc eﬀect is identiﬁable




In this chapter, I consider dormant independencies, in other words conditional
independencies in interventional distributions. I develop an algorithm which,
given two arbitrary sets of variables, determines in polynomial time if there is an
identiﬁable dormant independence between them. I show that this algorithm is
complete in a sense that if it fails, there is no “good graphical reason” for there to
be a dormant independence (although it might still exist in some models). I also
show how dormant independencies can be used for model testing and induction,
in a way similar to conditional independencies, by giving an algorithm which tests
for the presence of extraneous edges in causal diagrams.
7.1 An Example of Dormant Independence
Consider the causal graph in Fig. 7.1 (a). Any model which induces this graph
is subject to certain constraints on its observable distribution. Some of these
constraints are due to conditional independence. For instance, in any such model
X ⊥ ⊥ Z|W, which means P(x|w) must equal P(x|w,z). However, there is an
additional constraint implied by this graph which cannot be expressed in terms of
conditional independence in the observable distribution. This constraint, noted
in [VP90], states that the distribution
P
w P(y|z,w,x)P(w|x) is a function of
only y and z, but not x. The key insight that motivates this chapter is that this
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Figure 7.1: (a) The “P” graph. (b) The graph of the submodel Mz derived from
the “P” graph.
constraint does emanate from conditional independencies, albeit not the original
observable distribution, but rather in an interventional distribution.
Consider a model M inducing the graph in Fig. 7.1 (a). If we intervene on
Z, we obtain the submodel Mz inducing the graph in Fig. 7.1 (b). Moreover, the
distribution of the unﬁxed observables in this submodel, Pz(x,w,y), is identiﬁable
and equals to P(y|z,w,x)P(w|x)P(x). It’s not diﬃcult to establish by inspecting
the graph in Fig. 7.1 (b) that X is d-separated from Y , and so X ⊥ ⊥ Y in
Pz(x,w,y). This implies that Pz(y|x) = Pz(y). But it’s not hard to show that
Pz(y|x) is equal to
P
w P(y|z,w,x)P(w|x), which means this expression depends
only on z and y. Thus, the identiﬁability of Pz(x,w,y) leads to a constraint on
observational distributions in the original, unmutilated model M.
Enumerating constraints of this type can be used to infer features of the
causal graphs, just as conditional independencies are used for this purpose by
causal induction algorithms. For example, establishing that X is independent of
Y in Pz(x,w,y) allows us to conclude that the causal graph lacks an edge between
X and Y , assuming that the submodel Mz is stable [PV91], [Pea00], or faithful
[SGS93]. Moreover, since Pz(x,w,y) is identiﬁable from P(v) in the graph in
question, we can conclude the edge absence without relying on interventions.
In the remainder of this chapter, I show how to achieve a full enumeration of
conditional independencies in identiﬁable interventional distributions entailed by
82the structure of the graph, and how to use these independencies to infer features
of the graph.
7.2 Dormant Independence and d*-separation
I call a conditional independence dormant if it exists in an interventional distri-
bution.
Deﬁnition 16 (dormant independence) A dormant independence exists be-
tween variable sets X,Y in P(v) obtained from the causal graph G if there exist
variable sets Z,W such that P(y|x,z,do(w)) = P(y|z,do(w)). Furthermore, if
P(v),G ⊢id P(y,x|z,do(w)), the dormant independence is identiﬁable and I de-
note this as X ⊥ ⊥w Y|Z. If an identiﬁable dormant independence does not exist
between X,Y I write X  ⊥ ⊥∗ Y.
I would like to represent dormant independence using graphs. Fortunately,
every concept I used in the deﬁnition of dormant independence has a graphi-
cal interpretation: ordinary conditional independence can be represented using
d-separation, the eﬀect of interventions on a graph can be represented by cut-
ting incoming arrows to intervened nodes, and complete graphical conditions for
identiﬁcation of interventions has been developed in Chapter 4. Using these in-
terpretations together allows us to generalize d-separation in appropriate way to
mirror dormant independence. I call the resulting notion d*-separation.
Deﬁnition 17 (d*-separation) Let G be a causal diagram. Variable sets X,Y
are d*-separated in G given Z,W (written X ⊥w Y|Z), if we can ﬁnd sets Z,W,
such that X ⊥ Y|Z in Gw, and P(v),G ⊢id P(y,x|z,do(w)). If X,Y are not
d*-separable, we write X  ⊥∗ Y.
83Note that despite the presence of probability notation in the deﬁnition, this
is a purely graphical notion, since identiﬁcation can be determined using only
the graph by the back-door hedge criterion. Consequently, I can prove a theorem
analogous to Theorem 1 for identiﬁable dormant independencies, which allows us
to reason about such independencies graphically.
Theorem 27 Let G be a causal diagram. Then in any model M inducing G, if
X ⊥w Y|Z, then X ⊥ ⊥w Y|Z.
Proof: This follows from the fact that Gw is the graph induced by the submodel
Mw, and any submodel is just an ordinary causal model where Theorem 1 holds.
￿
In the following two sections I will develop a complete condition for d*-
separation of two disjoint sets of variables X and Y, and a corresponding algo-
rithm which returns the conditioning set Z and intervention set W which witness
this d*-separation. In this way I capture all identiﬁable dormant independencies
which have a “graphical reason” to exist.
7.3 D*-separation Among Singletons
In this section, I consider a simpler problem of determining if variables X and
Y can be rendered conditionally independent in some identiﬁable interventional
distribution. To characterize identiﬁable dormant independence between X and
Y , it makes sense to consider the “diﬃcult” neighborhoods of X,Y , in a sense that
no intervention on those neighborhoods is identiﬁable. I call such neighborhoods
ancestral confounding sets.
Deﬁnition 18 Let Y be a variable in G. A set S is ancestral confounded (ACS)
84for Y if S = An(Y )GS = C(Y )GS.
Ancestral confounded sets are “diﬃcult” because they can be used to form a
Y -rooted C-tree, and I know from Chapter 4 that the eﬀect of any intervention
in this structure on Y is not identiﬁable.
Theorem 28 Let S be ancestral confounded for Y . Then for any S′ ⊆ S \ {Y },
P(v),G  ⊢id P(y|do(s′)).
Proof: It’s trivial to construct a Y-rooted C-tree T from S. But it is known
from Theorem 3 that for any set S′ of nodes in T that does not contain Y ,
P(v),G  ⊢id P(y|do(s′)). ￿
In my search for suitable variables to intervene on, in order to separate X
and Y , I can exclude ancestral confounded sets for X and Y . But there can be
potentially many such sets. It would be preferable to exclude all such sets at
once. Fortunately, the following results allows us to accomplish just that.
Theorem 29 For any variable Y in G, there exists a unique maximum ancestral
confounded set (MACS) Ty.
Ty contains all ancestral confounded sets for Y , which means if I can ﬁnd
an eﬃcient procedure for computing Ty, I could rule out all “diﬃcult” sets from
consideration at once. Such an algorithm exists, and is given in Fig. 7.2.
Theorem 30 Find-MACS(G,Y ) outputs the MACS of Y in polynomial time.
In the eﬀort to d*-separate X and Y no interventions on nodes in in Tx
and Ty can be made, since these interventions are not identiﬁable. Furthermore,
85function Find-MACS(G,Y )
INPUT: G, a causal diagram, Y a node in G.
OUTPUT: Ty, the MACS for Y in G.
1 If (∃X  ∈ An(Y )G),
return Find-MACS(GAn(Y ),Y ).
2 If (∃X  ∈ C(Y )G),
return Find-MACS(GC(Y ),Y ).
3 Else, return G.
Figure 7.2: An algorithm for computing the MACS of a node.
conditioning on Ty or Tx does not d-separate paths from Y out of Ty which consist
entirely of colliders, although all paths with a non-collider are blocked. In order
to block some all-collider paths out of Tx,Ty we can attempt to intervene on the
set Pa(Tx∪Ty)\(Tx∪Ty). It turns out these interventions are suﬃcient to create
identiﬁable dormant independence among singletons, if one exists.
Theorem 31 Let Tx,Ty be the MACSs of X,Y . Let Ix,y = Pa(Tx∪Ty)\(Tx∪Ty).
Then if either X is a parent of Ty, Y is a parent of Tx or there is a bidirected
arc between Tx an Ty, then X,Y are not d*-separable. Otherwise, X ⊥ix,y Y |Tx∪
Ty \ {X,Y }.
To illustrate this theorem, consider the graph in Fig. 7.3. Here, Ty =
{K,L,N,Y }, and Tx = {W,X}. By Theorem 31, X ⊥z Y |W,K,L,N.
Thus, the MACSs turn out to be key structures for determining d*-separation








Figure 7.3: (a) A graph where X ⊥z Y |W,K,L,N. (b) A graph where X ⊥z Y ,
X ⊥k L, but X  ⊥∗ {Y,L}.
d*-separation among sets of variables.
7.4 D*-separation Among Sets
To determine if two arbitrary disjoint sets can be d*-separated I consider a multi-
node generalization of MACS. Unfortunately a MACS, as it is deﬁned in the pre-
vious section, is not guaranteed to exist for sets of nodes (consider for instance a
set consisting of two nodes with no path connecting them). In order to generalize
the notion of a MACS appropriately, I must consider a partition of an arbitrary
set where a MACS can be deﬁned for each element in the partition. I start with
a straightforward generalization of ancestral confounded sets for sets of variables.
Deﬁnition 19 Let Y be a variable set in G. A set S is ancestral confounded for
Y if for every Y ∈ Y,S = An(Y)GS = C(Y )GS.
I want to deﬁne an appropriate partition of an arbitrary set, where each
element of the partition has an ACS. I will show the following deﬁnition will
work for this purpose.
Deﬁnition 20 (AC-component) A set Y of nodes in G is an ancestral con-
founded component (AC-component) if
87• Y = {Y }, e.g., Y is a singleton set, or
• Y is a union of two distinct AC-components Y1,Y2 which have ancestral
confounded sets S1,S2, respectively, and S1,S2 are connected by a bidirected
arc
Lemma 11 Every AC-component has an ancestral confounded set.
AC-components behave just as singleton sets do with respect to ACS. In fact,
there is a unique MACS for every AC-component, and the algorithm to ﬁnd it is
the familiar Find-MACS with set inputs.
Theorem 32 Let Y be an AC-component. Then there exists a unique MACS Ty
for Y, and Find-MACS (shown in Fig. 7.4) ﬁnds it in polynomial time.
Proof: The proof is a straightforward generalization of the proof of Theorems 30
and 29. ￿
What I have shown is that certain special sets of nodes have a MACS, just
as singletons do. While I cannot show the same for arbitrary sets, I can show
the next best thing, namely that there exists a unique partition of any set into
AC-components.
Lemma 12 Let Y be a variable set, Y ∈ Y. Then there is a unique maximum
AC-component which both contains Y and is a subset of Y.
Theorem 33 Any variable set Y has a unique partition p, called the AC-partition,
where each element S in p is a maximal AC-component in a sense that no superset
of S which is also a subset of Y is an AC-component.
88There is a simple algorithm, shown in Fig. 7.4, which, given an arbitrary
set Y, ﬁnds the unique AC-partition p of Y, and ﬁnds the MACS for each AC-
component in p.
Theorem 34 Find-AC-Partition(G,Y) outputs the unique AC-partition of
Y, and the set of MACSs for each element in the partition.
I want to prove a result analogous to Theorem 31 for sets. To do so, I must
generalize the notion of an inducing path to sets.
Deﬁnition 21 (inducing paths for sets) Let X,Y be sets of variables in G.
A path p between X and Y is called an inducing path if the following two condi-
tions hold
• The path forms a collider for every non-terminal node
• Every non-terminal node is an ancestor of X or Y.
Not surprisingly, inducing paths characterize d-separability for sets just as
they do for singleton variables.
Theorem 35 X cannot be d-separated from Y in G if and only if there exists
an inducing path from X to Y in G,
I can now prove the generalization of Theorem 31 for sets. The idea is to ﬁnd
the AC-partition of X∪ Y, and generalize the two conditions for d*-separability
in Theorem 31 for this AC-partition.
Theorem 36 Let X,Y be arbitrary sets of variables. Let p be the AC-partition
of X∪Y. Then if either elements of both X and Y share a single AC-component
89function Find-AC-Partition(G,Y)
INPUT: G, a causal diagram, Y a set of nodes in G.
OUTPUT: p, the unique partition of Y into AC-components, and the unique
MACS Ts for each S ∈ P.
1 Let p be the partition of Y containing all singleton subsets of Y.
2 For each Y ∈ Y, let Ty = Find-MACS(G,{Y }).
3 Repeat until no merges are possible: If ∃Y1,Y2 ∈ p such that Ty1,Ty2
share a bidirected arc, merge Y1,Y2 into Y
′ in p, and let Ty′ = Find-
MACS(G,Y
′).
4 return p, and the set of MACSs for each element in p.
function Find-MACS(G,Y)
INPUT: G, a causal diagram, Y an AC-component in G.
OUTPUT: Ty, the MACS for Y in G.
1 If (∃X  ∈ An(Y)G),
return Find-MACS(GAn(Y),Y).
2 If (∃X  ∈ C(Y )G),
return Find-MACS(GC(Y),Y).
3 Else, return G.
Figure 7.4: An algorithm for computing the AC-partition (and the corresponding















Figure 7.5: (a) The true causal graph. (b) A possible valid graph for the same
domain.
in p, or some element of X is a parent of the MACS of some AC-component
containing elements of Y (or vice versa), then X cannot be d*-separated from
Y. Otherwise, let Tp be the union of all MACSs of elements in p, and let Ip =
Pa(Tp) \ Tp. Then, X ⊥ip Y|Tp \ (X ∪ Y).
I conclude this section by noting that just as was the case with conditional
independence, identiﬁable dormant independence among subsets does not entail
dormant independence on sets. For example, in the graph shown in Fig. 7.3 (b),
X ⊥z Y , X ⊥k L, but X  ⊥∗ {Y,L}.
Having given a complete solution to the problem of determining if arbitrary
sets can be d*-separated, I show in the next section how to use dormant inde-
pendence to test aspects of the causal diagram.
7.5 Testing Causal Structure
To illustrate the usefulness of identiﬁable dormant independencies for induction
and testing of causal structures, I consider the problem of detecting if certain
edges in a particular causal graph are extraneous. I call graphs where every edge
is either correct or extraneous valid.
91Deﬁnition 22 (valid graph) A causal graph G is valid for a model M if every
edge in the graph induced by M is present in G.
It is possible to rule out out the presence of certain extraneous edges using
conditional independence tests. In order to do so, an additional property of
stability [PV91], [Pea00], or faithfulness [SGS93] is assumed. In faithful models,
lack of d-separation implies dependence. In other words, X ⊥ Y|Z iﬀ X ⊥ ⊥ Y|Z.
This property allows us to reach graphical conclusions from probabilistic premises.
For instance, the presence of a conditioning set Z such that X ⊥ ⊥ Y |Z implies
X and Y cannot share an edge. Systematic use of conditional independence
tests to rule out adjacencies in this way is an important part of causal inference
algorithms such as IC [VP90], [Pea00] and FCI [SGS93].
The advantage of dormant independencies is their ability to rule out edges
even if all conditional independence tests fail. For instance, it is possible to rule
out the edge from X to Y in Fig. 7.5 (b) as extraneous since X ⊥z Y , though
no conditional independence test can succeed in doing the same, since there is an
inducing path from X to Y .
However, in order to reach graphical conclusions from dormant independen-
cies, I need to extend the faithfulness property to hold in interventional settings.
Deﬁnition 23 (experimental faithfulness) A model M is experimentally faith-
ful, or P∗-faithful if every submodel Mx of M is faithful (that is d-connectedness
in Gx implies dependence).
Experimental faithfulness states that no “numerically coincidental indepen-
dencies” are introduced by interventions. I use dormant independence tests to
rule out extraneous edges in valid graphs of experimentally faithful models. To
test if an edge between X and Y is extraneous, I must ﬁnd sets Z,W such that
92function Test-Edges(G,P(v))
INPUT: G, a valid graph of an experimentally faithful model M, P(v), a
corresponding probability distribution.
OUTPUT G′, a valid graph with some extraneous edges removed.
• Let π be a topological order of edges in G, where (X,Y ) ≺π (W,Z) if
X,Y ∈ An({W,Z})G. Let G′ equal G.
• For every edge (X,Y ) in π, if we can ﬁnd sets Z,W using Theorem 31 such
that X ⊥w Y |Z in G′ \ (X,Y ), and
X ⊥ ⊥w Y |Z in P(v),G′, remove (X,Y ) from G′.
• return G′.
Figure 7.6: An algorithm for testing edges in valid graphs.
X ⊥ ⊥w Y |Z. A naive brute-force approach to this problem is intractable since I
must try all subsets Z,W. However, if I assume the edge I am testing is absent
in the graph, I can use the Find-MACS algorithm to propose a dormant inde-
pendence to test in polynomial time. Since this independence is guaranteed to
be identiﬁable, the test can be performed on the observational distribution alone.
There is an additional complication, namely that certain edges ancestral to X and
Y may themselves be extraneous. This may result in a situation where X  ⊥∗ Y
if the ancestral extraneous edges are present, while a dormant independence can
be established if they are removed. Fortunately, since I restrict myself to acyclic
graphs, I can establish a topological order among edges based on ancestry, and
test for extraneous edges using this order. The resulting algorithm is shown in
Fig. 7.6
93It is not diﬃcult to establish that Test-Edges is sound.
Theorem 37 Test-Edges terminates in polynomial time, and any edge it re-
moves from G′, valid for an experimentally faithful model M, is extraneous.
To illustrate the operation of the algorithm, consider the valid graph G′ in
Fig. 7.5 (b). If the graph G in Fig. 7.5 (a) represents the true causal model,
Test-Edges will be able to remove the edges (X,Y ) and (X,L), but not the
edge (L,Y ). In the case of (X,Y ), X ⊥z Y in G′ \(X,Y ) and the corresponding
dormant independence holds since the true model induces G. Similarly, for (X,L),
X ⊥k L in G′ \ (X,L) and the corresponding dormant independence holds. On
the other hand, even though (Y,L) is an extraneous edge, Test-Edges cannot
remove it, since the algorithm cannot establish dormant independence between Y
and L, even though P(y,l|do(z,k)) is identiﬁable in the true model. The intuition
here is that this identiﬁcation relies on the absence of the very edge we are trying
to test (since P(y,l|do(z,k)) is not identiﬁable in G′).
Similarly, if the graph G shown in Fig. 7.3 (a) is the true causal graph, and
the valid graph contains an extra edge from X to Y , Test-Edges will be able
to remove this edge since X ⊥z Y |W,K,L,N in G, and P(v),G′ ⊢id Pz(v \ z),
where G′ is G plus any edge from X to Y .
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Conclusions
In this thesis, I have considered the problem of evaluating a variety of causal
queries (causal eﬀects, counterfactuals and path-speciﬁc eﬀects) from available in-
formation, represented as observational or interventional distributions, and causal
assumptions, represented in the form of a graph. I have presented complete al-
gorithms for all identiﬁcation problems I considered, and used these algorithms
to derive graphical characterizations of identiﬁable and non-identiﬁable queries.
Furthermore, I considered the notion of dormant independence, namely con-
ditional independence in interventional distributions. I showed how certain al-
gebraic constraints induced on the observable distribution by the causal graph
arise due to identiﬁable dormant independencies. I have provided a graphical
notion of d*-separation which mirrors identiﬁable dormant independence, and
given a complete algorithm which determines if two disjoint sets of variables can
be d*-separated. Finally, I have used dormant independence to construct another
algorithm which tests for the presence of extraneous arcs in a causal graph.
95APPENDIX A
Proofs for Chapter 4 (Causal Eﬀects)
Theorem 2 P(v),G  ⊢id P(y|do(x)) in G shown in Fig. 3.1 (a).
Proof: I construct two causal models M1 and M2 such that P 1(X,Y ) = P 2(X,Y ),
and P 1
x(Y )  = P 2
x(Y ). The two models agree on the following: all 3 variables
are boolean, U is a fair coin, and fX(u) = u. Let ⊕ denote the exclusive or
(XOR) function. Then the value of Y is determined by the function u ⊕ x
in M1, while Y is set to 0 in M2. Then P 1(Y = 0) = P 2(Y = 0) = 1,
P 1(X = 0) = P 2(X = 0) = 0.5. Therefore, P 1(X,Y ) = P 2(X,Y ), while
P 2
x(Y = 0) = 1  = P 1
x(Y = 0) = 0.5. Note that while P is non-positive, it is
straightforward to modify the proof for the positive case by letting fY functions
in both models return 1 half the time, and the values outlined above half the
time. ￿
Theorem 3 Let G be a Y -rooted C-tree. Let X be any subset of observable nodes
in G which does not contain Y . Then P(v),G  ⊢id P(y|do(x)).
Proof: I generalize the proof for the bow arc graph. I can assume without loss
of generality that each unobservable U in G has exactly two observable children.
I construct two models with binary nodes. In the ﬁrst model, the value of all
observable nodes is set to the bit parity (sum modulo 2) of the parent values.
In the second model, the same is true for all nodes except Y , with the latter
being set to 0 explicitly. All U nodes in both models are fair coins. Since G is
a tree, and since every U ∈ U has exactly two children in G, every U ∈ U has
96exactly two distinct downward paths to Y in G. It’s then easy to establish that
Y counts the bit parity of every node in U twice in the ﬁrst model. But this
implies P 1(Y = 1) = 0.
Because bidirected arcs form a spanning tree over observable nodes in G, for
any set of nodes X such that Y  ∈ X, there exists U ∈ U with one child in
An(X)G and one child in G\An(X)G. Thus P 1
x(Y = 1) > 0, but P 2
x(Y = 1) = 0.
It is straightforward to generalize this proof for the positive P(v) in the same
way as in Theorem 2. ￿
Theorem 4 P(v),G  ⊢id P(y|do(pa(y))) if and only if there exists a subgraph of
G which is a Y -rooted C-tree.
Proof: From [Tia02], I know that whenever there is no subgraph G′ of G, such
that all nodes in G′ are ancestors of Y , and G′ is a C-component, Ppa(Y )(Y ) is
identiﬁable. From Theorem 3, I know that if there is a Y -rooted C-tree containing
a non-empty subset S of parents of Y , then Ps(Y ) is not identiﬁable. But it is
always possible to extend the counterexamples which prove non-identiﬁcation of
Ps(Y ) with additional variables which are independent. ￿
Theorem 5 Let F,F ′ be subgraphs of G which form a hedge for P(y|do(x)).
Then P(v),G  ⊢id P(y|do(x)).
Proof: I ﬁrst show Px(r) is not identiﬁable in F. As before, I assume each U has
two observable children. I construct two models with binary nodes. In M1 every
variable in F is equal to the bit parity of its parents. In M2 the same is true,
except all nodes in F ′ disregard the parent values in F \ F ′. All U are fair coins
in both models.
As was the case with C-trees, for any C-forest F, every U ∈ U∩F has exactly
two downward paths to R. It is now easy to establish that in M1, R counts the
bit parity of every node in U
1 twice, while in M2, R counts the bit parity of
97every node in U
2 ∩F ′ twice. Thus, in both models with no interventions, the bit
parity of R is even.
Next, ﬁx two distinct instantiations of U that diﬀer by values of U
∗. Consider
the topmost node W ∈ F with an odd number of parents in U
∗ (which exists
because bidirected edges in F form a spanning tree). Then ﬂipping the values of
U
∗ once will ﬂip the value W once. Thus the function from U to V induced by
a C-forest F in M1 and M2 is one to one.
The above results, coupled with the fact that in a C-forest, |U| + 1 = |V|
implies that any assignment where
P
r (mod 2) = 0 is equally likely, and all
other node assignments are impossible in both F and F ′. Since the two models
agree on all functions and distributions in F \ F ′,
P
f′ P 1 =
P
f′ P 2. It follows
that the observational distributions are the same in both models.
As before, I can ﬁnd U ∈ U with one child in An(X)F, and one child in
F \ An(X)F, which implies the probability of odd bit parity of R is 0.5 in M1,
and 0 in M2.
Next, I note that the construction so far results in a non-positive distribu-
tion P. To rid this proof of non-positivity, I “soften” the two models with new
unobservable binary UR for every R ∈ R which assumes value 1 with very small
probability p. Whenever UR is 1, the node R ﬂips its value, otherwise it keeps
the value as deﬁned above. Note that P(v) will remain the same in both mod-
els because the augmentation is the same, and the previous unsoftened models
agreed on P(v). It’s easy to see that the bit parity of R in both models will be
odd only when an odd number of UR assume values of 1. Because p is arbitrarily
small, the probability of an odd parity is far smaller than the probability of even
parity. Now consider what happens after do(x). In M2, the probability of odd
bit parity stays the same. In M1 before the addition of UR, the probability was
980.5. But it’s easy to see that UR nodes change the bit parity of R in a completely
symmetric way, so the probability of even parity remains 0.5.
This implies Px(r) is not identiﬁable. Finally, to see that Px(y) is not identi-
ﬁable, augment the counterexample by nodes in I = An(Y) ∩ De(R). Without
loss of generality, assume every node in I has at most one child. Let each node I
in I be equal to the bit parity of its parents. Moreover, each I has an exogenous
parent UI independent of the rest of U which, with small probability p causes it
to ﬂip it’s value. Then the bit parity of Y is even if and only if an odd number
of UI turn on. Moreover, it’s easy to see P(I|R) is positive by construction. I
can now repeat the previous argument. ￿
Next, I provide the proof of soundness of ID and IDC using do-calculus. This
both simpliﬁes the proofs and allows us to infer do-calculus is complete from
completeness of these algorithms. I will invoke do-calculus rules by just using
their number, for instance “by rule 2.” First, I prove that a joint distribution
in a causal model can be represented as a product of interventional distributions
corresponding to the set of c-component in the graph induced by the model.
Lemma 13 (c-component factorization) Let M be a causal model with graph





Proof: A proof of this was derived by [Tia02]. Nevertheless, I reprove this result
using do-calculus to help with the subsequent completeness results. Assume


























π ) = P(v)
The ﬁrst identity is by rule 3, the second is by chain rule of probability.
To prove the third identity, I consider two cases. If A ∈ Ai \ V
(j−1)
π , I can
eliminate the intervention on A from the expression Pai(vj|v
(j−1)




If A ∈ Ai∩V
(j−1)
π , consider any back-door path from Ai to Vj. Any such path
with a node not in V
(j−1)
π will be d-separated because, due to recursiveness, it
must contain a blocked collider. Further, this path must contain bidirected arcs
only, since all nodes on this path are conditioned or ﬁxed. Because Ai ∩ Si = ∅,
all such paths are d-separated. The identity now follows from rule 2.
The last two identities are just grouping of terms, and application of chain
rule. Having proven that c-component factorization holds for P(v), I want to
extend the result to Px(y). First, let’s consider Px(v\x). This is just the distri-
bution of the submodel Mx. But Mx is just an ordinary causal model inducing
G \ X, so I can apply the same reasoning to obtain Px(v \ x) =
Q
i Pv\si(si),
where C(G \ X) = {S1,...,Sk}. As a last step, it’s easy to verify that Px(y) =
P
v\(x∪y) Px(v \ x). ￿
Lemma 14 Let X
′ = X ∩ An(Y)G. Then Px(y) obtained from P in G is equal
to P ′
x′(y) obtained from P ′ = P(An(Y)) in An(Y)G.
Proof: Let W = V\An(Y)G. Then the submodel Mw induces the graph G\W =
An(Y)G, and its distribution is P ′ = Pw(An(Y)) = P(An(Y)) by rule 3. Now
Px(y) = Px′(y) = Px′,w(y) = P ′
x′(y) by rule 3. ￿
Lemma 15 Let W = (V \ X) \ An(Y)Gx. Then Px(y) = Px,w(y), where w are
arbitrary values of W.
100Proof: Note that by assumption, Y ⊥ W|X in Gx,w. The conclusion follows by
rule 3. ￿







Proof: If line 6 preconditions are met, then G local to that recursive call is
partitioned into S and X, and there are no bidirected arcs from X to S. The
conclusion now follows from the proof of Lemma 13. ￿
Lemma 17 Whenever the conditions of the last recursive call of ID are satis-
ﬁed, Px obtained from P in the graph G is equal to P ′






π \ S′) in the graph S′.
Proof: It is easy to see that when the last recursive call executes, X and S
partition G, and X ⊂ An(S)G. This implies that the submodel Mx\S′ induces
the graph G \ (X \ S′) = S′. The distribution Px\S′ of Mx\S′ is equal to P ′ by
the proof of Lemma 13. It now follows that Px = Px∩S′,x\S′ = P ′
x∩S′. ￿
Theorem 38 (soundness) Whenever ID returns an expression for Px(y), it is
correct.
Proof: If x = ∅, the desired eﬀect can be obtained from P by marginalization,
thus this base case is clearly correct. The soundness of all other lines except the
failing line 5 has already been established. ￿
Having established soundness, I show that whenever ID fails, we can recover
a hedge for an eﬀect involving a subset of variables involved in the original eﬀect
expression P(y|do(x)). This in turn implies completeness.
101Theorem 39 Assume ID fails to identify Px(y) (executes line 5). Then there
exist X
′ ⊆ X, Y
′ ⊆ Y such that the graph pair G,S returned by the fail condition
of ID contain as edge subgraphs C-forests F,F ′ that form a hedge for Px′(y′).
Proof: Consider line 5, and G and y local to that recursive call. Let R be the
root set of G. Since G is a single C-component, it is possible to remove a set of
directed arrows from G while preserving the root set R such that the resulting
graph F is an R-rooted C-forest.
Moreover, since F ′ = F ∩ S is closed under descendants, and since only
single directed arrows were removed from S to obtain F ′, F ′ is also a C-forest.
F ′ ∩ X = ∅, and F ∩ X  = ∅ by construction. R ⊆ An(Y)Gx by lines 2 and 3 of
the algorithm. It’s also clear that y,x local to the recursive call in question are
subsets of the original input. ￿
Theorem 6 ID is complete.
Proof: By the previous theorem, if ID fails, then Px′(y′) is not identiﬁable in a
subgraph H = GAn(Y)∩De(F) of G. Moreover, X∩H = X
′, by construction of H.
As such, it is easy to extend the counterexamples in Theorem 39 with variables
independent of H, with the resulting models inducing G, and witnessing the
unidentiﬁability of Px(y). ￿
Next, I prove the results necessary to establish completeness of IDC.
Lemma 18 If rule 2 of do-calculus applies to a set Z in G for Px(y|w) then
there are no d-connected paths to Y that pass through Z in neither G1 = G \ X
given Z,W nor in G2 = G \ (X ∪ Z) given W.
Proof: Clearly, there are no d-connected paths through Z in G2 given W. Con-
sider a d-connected path through Z ∈ Z to Y in G1, given Z,W. Note that this
102path must either form a collider at Z or a collider which is an ancestor of Z. But
this must mean there is a back-door path from Z to Y, which is impossible, since
rule 2 is applicable to Z in G for Px(y|w). Contradiction. ￿
Theorem 8 For any G and any conditional eﬀect Px(y|w) there exists a unique
maximal set Z = {Z ∈ W|Px(y|w) = Px,z(y|w\{z})} such that rule 2 applies to
Z in G for Px(y|w). In other words, Px(y|w) = Px,z(y|w \ z).
Proof: Fix two maximal sets Z1,Z2 ⊆ W such that rule 2 applies to Z1,Z2 in
G for Px(y|w). If Z1  = Z2, ﬁx Z ∈ Z1 \ Z2. By Lemma 18, rule 2 applies for
{Z} ∪ Z2 in G for Px(y|w), contradicting the original assumption.
Thus if I ﬁx G and Px(y|w), any set to which rule 2 applies must be a
subset of the unique maximal set Z. It follows that Z = {Z ∈ W|Px(y|w) =
Px,z(y|w \ {z})}. ￿
Lemma 19 Let F,F ′ form a hedge for Px(y). Then F ⊆ F ′ ∪ X.
Proof: It has been shown that ID fails on Px(y) in G and returns a hedge if and
only if Px(y) is not identiﬁable in G. In particular, edge subgraphs of the graphs
G and S returned by line 5 of ID form the C-forests of the hedge in question. It
is easy to check that a subset of X and S partition G. ￿
I rephrase the statement of Theorem 9 somewhat, to reduce “algebraic clut-
ter.”
Theorem 9 Let Px(y|w) be such that every W ∈ W has a back-door path to
Y in G \ X given W \ {W}. Then Px(y|w) is identiﬁable in G if and only if
Px(y,w) is identiﬁable in G.
Proof: If Px(y,w) is identiﬁable in G, then we can certainly identify Px(y|w) by














Figure A.1: Inductive cases for proving non-identiﬁability of Px(y|w,w′).
identiﬁable then neither is Px(y|w).
Assume Px(w) is identiﬁable. Then if Px(y|w) were identiﬁable, I would be
able to compute Px(y,w) by the chain rule. Thus the conclusion follows.
Assume Px(w) is not identiﬁable. I also know that every W ∈ W contains
a back-door path to some Y ∈ Y in G \ X given W \ {W}. Fix such W and
Y , along with a subgraph p of G which forms the witnessing back-door path.




Let H = GDe(F)∪An(W′)G
x′. I will attempt to show that Px′(Y |w) is not
identiﬁable in H ∪ p. Without loss of generality, I make the following three
assumptions. First, I restrict my attention to W
′′ ⊆ W that occurs in H ∪ p.
Second, I assume p is a path segment which starts at H and ends at Y , and does
not intersect H. Third, I assume all observable nodes in H have at most one
child.
Consider the models M1,M2 from the proof of Theorem 5 which induce H. I
extend the models by adding to them binary variables in p. Each variable X ∈ p
is equal to the bit parity of its parents, if it has any. If not, X behaves as a fair















Figure A.2: Inductive cases for proving non-identiﬁability of Px(y|w,w′).
Call the resulting models M1
∗,M2
∗. Because M1,M2 agreed on P(H), and
variables and functions in p are the same in both models, P 1
∗ = P 2
∗. I will
assume w′′ assigns 0 to every variable in W
′′. What remains to be shown is that
P 1
∗x(y|w′′)  = P 2
∗x(y|w′′). I will prove this by induction on the path structure of
p. I handle the inductive cases ﬁrst. In all these cases, I ﬁx a node Y ′ that is
between Y and H on the path p, and prove that if Px′(y′|w′′) is not identiﬁable,
then neither is Px′(y|w′′).
Assume neither Y nor Y ′ have descendants in W
′′. If Y ′ is a parent of Y
as in Fig. A.1 (a), then Px′(y|w′′) =
P
y′ P(y|y′)Px′(y′|w′′). If Y is a parent of
Y ′, as in Fig. A.1 (b) then the next node in p must be a child of Y ′. Therefore,
Px′(y|w′′) =
P
y′ P(y|y′)Px′(y′|w′′). In either case, by construction P(Y |Y ′) is a 2
by 2 identity matrix. This implies that the mapping from Px′(y′|w′′) to Px′(y|w′′)
is one to one. If Y ′ and Y share a hidden common parent U as in Fig. A.2 (b),
then the result follows by combining the previous two cases.
The next case is if Y and Y have a common child C which is either in W
′′ or
has a descendant in W
′′, as in Fig. A.2 (a). Now Px′(y|w′′) =
P
y′ P(y|y′,c)Px′(y′|w′′).
Because all nodes in W
′′ were observed to be 0, P(y|y′,c) is again a 2 by 2 identity
matrix.



















Figure A.3: Base cases for proving non-identiﬁability of Px(y|w,w′).
ﬁrst node not in H on the path p. Let Y ′ be the last node in H on the path p.
Assume Y is a parent of Y ′, as shown in Fig. A.3 (a). By Lemma 19,
I can assume Y  ∈ An(F \ F ′)H. By construction, (
P
W
′′ = Y + 2 ∗
P
U)




′′ = Y + 2 ∗
P
(U ∩ F ′)) (mod 2) in M2
∗. If every
variable in W
′′ is observed to be 0, then Y = (2 ∗
P
U) (mod 2) in M1
∗, and
Y = (2 ∗
P
(U ∩ F ′)) (mod 2) in M2




′′ = Y +2∗
P
(U∩F ′)) (mod 2) in M2
∗x, by construction. Thus if W
′′ are
all observed to be zero, Y = 0 with probability 1. Note that in M1
x as constructed





′) (mod 2), where U
′ ⊆ U consists
of unobservable nodes with one child in An(X)F and one child in F \ An(X)F.
Because Y  ∈ An(F \ F ′)H, I can conclude that if W
′′ are observed to be 0,
Y = (x +
P
U
′) (mod 2) in M1
∗x′. Thus, Y = 0 with probability 0.5. Therefore,
P 1
∗x′(y|w′′)  = P 2
∗x′(y|w′′) in this case.
Assume Y is a child of Y ′. Now consider a graph G′ which is obtained from
H∪p by removing the (unique) outgoing arrow from Y ′ in H. If Px′(Y |w′′) is not
identiﬁable in G′, I am done. Assume Px′(Y |w′′) is identiﬁable in G′. If Y ′ ∈ F,
and R is the root set of F, then removing the Y ′-outgoing directed arrow from
F results in a new C-forest, with a root set R ∪ {Y ′}. Because Y is a child of
Y ′, the new C-forests form a hedge for Px′(y,w′′). If Y ′ ∈ H \ F, then removing
106the Y ′-outgoing directed arrow results in substituting Y for W ∈ W
′′∩De(Y ′)H.
Thus in G′, F,F ′ form a hedge for Px′(y,w′′ \ {w}). In either case, Px′(y,w′′) is
not identiﬁable in G′.
If Px′(w′′) is identiﬁable in G′, I am done. If not, consider a smaller hedge
H′ ⊂ H witnessing this fact. Now consider the segment p′ of p between Y and
H′. I can repeat the inductive argument for H′, p′ and Y . See Fig. A.3 (b).
If Px′(w′′) is identiﬁable in G′, I am done. If not, consider a smaller hedge
H′ ⊂ H witnessing this fact. Now consider the segment p′ of p between Y and
H′. I can repeat the inductive argument for H′, p′ and Y . See Fig. A.3 (b). If
Y and Y ′ have a hidden common parent, as is the case in Fig. A.3 (c), I can
combine the ﬁrst inductive case, and the ﬁrst base case to prove the result.
I conclude the proof by introducing a slight change to rid us of non-positivity
in the distributions P 1,P 2 in the counterexamples. Speciﬁcally, for every node
I in p ∪ (De(R) ∩ An(Y)), add a new binary exogenous parent UI which is
independent of other nodes in U, and has an arbitrarily small probability of
assuming the value 1, and causing its child to ﬂip its current value. I let Podd
be the probability an odd number of UI nodes assume the value 1. Because
P(UI = 1) is vanishingly small for every I, Podd is much smaller than 0.5. It’s
easy to see that P is positive in counterexamples augmented in this way. In the
base case when Y is a parent of Y ′, I modify my equations to account for the
addition of UI. Speciﬁcally, (
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UI) (mod 2) in M2
∗, where UU is the set of nodes
added. If every variable in W





(mod 2) in M1




UI) (mod 2) in M2
∗. So prior to the
intervention, P(Y = 1|w′′) = Podd. But because P 1
x′(Y = 1|w′′) = 0.5, adding UI
nodes to the model does not change this probability. Because P 2(Y = 1|w′′) =
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x(Y = 1|w′′), the conclusion follows.
In the inductive cases above, I showed that Px(Y ′ = Y |W
′′) = 1 in our coun-
terexamples. It’s easy to see that with the addition of UI, Px(Y ′ = Y |W
′′) = Podd.
This implies that if P 1
x(Y ′|W
′′)  = P 2
x(Y ′|W
′′), then P 1
x(Y |W
′′)  = P 2
x(Y |W
′′).
This completes the proof. ￿
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Proofs for Chapter 5 (Counterfactuals)




Proof: Let x =
S
sub(S). Since the preconditions are met, x does not contain
conﬂicting assignments to the same variable, which means do(x) is a sound action
in the original causal model. Note that for any variable Yw in S, any variable in
(Pa(S)\S)∩An(Yw)S is already in w, while any variable in (Pa(S)\S)\An(Yw)S
can be added to the subscript of Yw without changing the variable. Since Y ∩X =
∅ by assumption, Yw = Yx. Since Yw was arbitrary, The result follows. ￿
For convenience, I show the soundness of ID* and IDC* asserted in Theorem
12 separately.
Theorem 12 a If ID* succeeds, the expression it returns is equal to P(γ) in a
given causal graph.
Proof: The proof outline in section 3 is suﬃcient for everything except the base
cases. In particular, line 6 follows by Lemma 13. For soundness, we only need to
handle the positive base case, which follows from Lemma 16. ￿
The soundness of IDC* is also fairly straightforward.
Theorem 12 b If IDC* does not output FAIL, the expression it returns is
equal to P(γ|δ) in a given causal graph, if that expression is deﬁned, and UN-
109DEFINED otherwise.
Proof: Theorem 8 shows how an operation similar to line 4 is sound by rule 2
of do-calculus [Pea95] when applied in a causal diagram. But I know that the
counterfactual graph is just a causal diagram for a model where some nodes share
functions, so the same reasoning applies. The rest is straightforward. ￿
To show completeness of ID* and IDC*, I ﬁrst prove a utility lemma which
will make it easier to construct counterexamples which agree on P∗ but disagree
on a given counterfactual query.
Lemma 20 Let G be a causal graph partitioned into a set {S1,...,Sk} of C-




v\si agree on P∗ for every C-component Si, and value assignment v \ si.
Proof: This follows from C-component factorization: P(v) =
Q
i Pv\si(si). This
implies that for every do(x), Px(v) can be expressed as a product of terms
Pv\(si\x)(si \ x), which implies the result. ￿
The next result generalizes Lemma 4 to a wider set of counterfactual graphs
which result from non-identiﬁable queries.
Lemma 5 Assume G is such that X is a parent of Y and Z, and Y and Z
are connected by a bidirected path with observable nodes W 1,...,W k on the path.
Then P∗,G  ⊢id P(yx,w1,...,wk,zx′),P(yx,w1,...,wk,z) for any value assignments
y,w1,...,wk,z.
Proof: I construct two models with graph G as follows. In both models, all
variables are binary, and P(u) is uniform. In M1, each variable is set to the bit
parity of its parents. In M2, the same is true except Y and Z ignore the values
of X. To prove that the two models agree on P∗, I use Lemma 20. Clearly the
110two models agree on P(X). To show that the models also agree on Px(V \ X)
for all values of x, note that in M2 each value assignment over V \ X with even
bit parity is equally likely, while no assignment with odd bit parity is possible.
But the same is true in M1 because any value of x contributes to the bit parity
of V \ X exactly twice. The agreement of M1
x,M2
x on P∗ follows by the graph
structure of G.
To see that the result is true, I note ﬁrstly that P(ΣiW i+Yx+Zx′ (mod 2) =
1) = P(ΣiW i+Yx+Z (mod 2) = 1) = 0 in M2, while the same probabilities are
positive in M1, and secondly that in both models distributions P(yx,w1,...,wk,zx′)
and P(yx,w1,..,wk,z) are uniform. Note that the proof is easy to generalize for
positive P∗ by adding a small probability for Y to ﬂip its normal value. ￿
To obtain a full characterization of non-identiﬁable counterfactual graphs,
I augment the diﬃcult graphs I obtained from the previous two results using
certain graph transformation rules which preserve non-identiﬁability. These rules
are given in the following two lemmas.
Lemma 6 Assume P∗,G  ⊢id P(γ). Let {y1
x1,...,yn
xm} be a subset of counterfactual
events in γ. Let G′ be a graph obtained from G by adding a new child W of
Y 1,...,Y n. Let γ′ = (γ \ {y1
x1,...,yn
xm}) ∪ {wx1,...,wxm}, where w is an arbitrary
value of W. Then P∗,G′  ⊢id P(γ′).
Proof: Let M1,M2 witness P∗,G  ⊢id P(γ). I will extend these models to witness
P∗,G′  ⊢id P(γ′). Since the function of a newly added W will be shared, and
M1,M2 agree on P∗ in G, the extensions will agree on P∗ by Lemma 20. I have
two cases.
Assume there is a variable Y i such that yi
xj,yi
xk are in γ. By Lemma 4,
P∗,G  ⊢id P(yi
xj,yi
xk). Then let W be a child of just Y i, and assume |W| = |Y i| =
c. Let W be set to the value of Y i with probability 1 − ǫ, and otherwise it is set
111to a uniformly chosen random value of Y i among the other c − 1 values. Since ǫ
is arbitrarily small, and since Wxj and Wxk pay attention to the same U variable,
it is possible to set ǫ in such a way that if P 1(Y i
xj,Y i
xk)  = P 2(Y i
xj,Y i
xk), however
minutely, then P 1(Wxj,Wxk)  = P 2(Wxj,Wxk).
Otherwise, let |W| =
Q
i |Y i|, and let P(W|Y 1,...,Y n) be an invertible stochas-
tic matrix. The result follows. ￿
Lemma 7 Assume P∗,G  ⊢id P(γ). Let G′ be obtained from G by merging some
two nodes X,Y into a new node Z where Z inherits all the parents and children
of X,Y , subject to the following restrictions:
• The merge does not create cycles.
• If (∃ws ∈ γ) where x ∈ s, y  ∈ s, and X ∈ An(W)G, then Y  ∈ An(W)G.
• If (∃ys ∈ γ) where x ∈ s, then An(X)G = ∅.
• If (Yw,Xs ∈ γ), then w and s agree on all variable settings.
Assume |X|×|Y | = |Z| and there’s some isomorphism f assigning value pairs
x,y to a value f(x,y) = z. Let γ′ be obtained from γ as follows. For any ws ∈ γ:
• If W  ∈ {X,Y }, and values x,y occur in s, replace them by f(x,y).
• If W  ∈ {X,Y }, and the value of one of X,Y occur in s, replace it by some
z consistent with the value of X or Y .
• If X,Y do not occur in γ, leave γ as is.
• If W = Y and x ∈ s, replace ws by f(x,y)s\{x}.
• otherwise, replace every variable pair of the form Yr = y,Xs = x by Zr,s =
f(x,y).
112Then P∗,G′  ⊢id P(γ′).
Proof: Let Z be the Cartesian product of X,Y , and ﬁx f. I want to show that
the proof of non-identiﬁcation of P(γ) in G carries over to P(γ′) in G′.
I have four types of modiﬁcations to variables in γ. The ﬁrst clearly results
in the same counterfactual variable. For the second, due to the restrictions I
imposed, wz = wz,y,x, which means I can apply the ﬁrst modiﬁcation.
For the third, I have P(γ) = P(δ,yx,z). By my restrictions, and rule 2 of do-
calculus [Pea95], this is equal to P(δ,yz|xz). Since this is not identiﬁable, then
neither is P(δ,yz,xz). Now it’s clear that this modiﬁcation is equivalent to the
fourth.
The fourth modiﬁcation is simply a merge of events consistent with a single
causal world into a conjunctive event, which does not change the overall expres-
sion. ￿
I am now ready to show the main completeness results for counterfactual iden-
tiﬁcation algorithms. Again, I prove this results separately for ID* and IDC*
for convenience.
Theorem 13 a ID* is complete.
Proof: I want to show that if line 8 fails, the original P(γ) cannot be identiﬁed.
There are two broad cases to consider. If Gγ contains the w-graph, the result
follows by Lemmas 4 and 6. If not, I argue as follows.
Fix some X which witnesses the precondition on line 8. I can assume X is a
parent of some nodes in S. Assume no other node in sub(S) aﬀects S (eﬀectively
I delete all edges from parents of S to S except from X). Because the w-graph
is not a part of Gγ, this has no ramiﬁcations on edges in S. Further, I assume X
has two values in S.
113If X  ∈ S, ﬁx Y,W ∈ S ∩ Ch(X). Assume S has no directed edges at all.
Then P∗,G  ⊢id P(S) by Lemma 5. The result now follows by Lemma 6, and by
construction of Gγ, which implies all nodes in S have some descendant in γ.
If S has directed edges, I want to show P∗,G  ⊢id P(R(S)), where R(S) is the
subset of S with no children in S. I can recover this from the previous case as
follows. Assume S has no edges as before. For a node Y ∈ S, ﬁx a set of childless
nodes X ∈ S which are to be their parents. Add a virtual node Y ′ which is a
child of all nodes in X. Then P∗,G  ⊢id P((S \ X) ∪ Y ′) by Lemma 6. Then
P∗,G  ⊢id P(R(S′)), where S′ is obtained from S by adding edges from X to Y
by Lemma 7, which applies because no w-graph exists in Gγ. I can apply this
step inductively to obtain the desired forest (all nodes have at most one child) S
while making sure P∗,G  ⊢id P(R(S)).
If S is not a forest, I can simply disregard extra edges so eﬀectively it is a
forest. Since the w-graph is not in Gγ this does not aﬀect edges from X to S.
If X ∈ S, ﬁx Y ∈ S ∩ Ch(X). If S has no directed edges at all, replace
X by a new virtual node Y , and make X be the parent of Y . By Lemma 5,
P∗,G  ⊢id P((S \ x) ∪ yx). I now repeat the same steps as before, to obtain
that P∗,G  ⊢id P((R(S) \ x) ∪ yx) for general S. Now I use Lemma 7 to obtain
P∗,G  ⊢id P(R(S)). Having shown P∗,G  ⊢id P(R(S)), I conclude the result by
inductively applying Lemma 6. ￿
Theorem 13 b IDC* is complete.
Proof: The diﬃcult step is to show that after line 5 is reached, if P∗,G  ⊢id P(γ,δ)
then P∗,G  ⊢id P(γ|δ). If P∗,G ⊢id P(δ), this is obvious. Assume P∗,G  ⊢id P(δ).
Fix the S which witnesses that for δ′ ⊆ δ, P∗,G  ⊢id P(δ′). Fix some Y such that
a back-door, i.e. starting with an incoming arrow, path exists from δ′ to Y in
Gγ,δ. I want to show that P∗,G  ⊢id P(Y |δ′). Let G′ = GAn(δ′)∩De(S).
114Assume Y is a parent of a node D ∈ δ′, and D ∈ G′. Augment the counterex-
ample models which induce counterfactual graph G′ with an additional binary
node for Y , and let the value of D be set as the old value plus Y modulo |D|. Let
Y attain value 1 with vanishing probability ǫ. That the new models agree on P∗
is easy to establish. To see that P∗,G  ⊢id P(δ′) in the new model, note that P(δ′)
in the new model is equal to P(δ′ \ D,D = d) ∗ (1 − ǫ) + P(δ′ \ D,D = (d − 1)
(mod |D|)) ∗ ǫ. Because ǫ is arbitrarily small, this implies the result. To show
that P∗,G  ⊢id P(Y = 1|δ′), I must show that the models disagree on P(δ′|Y =
1)/P(δ′). But to do this, I must simply ﬁnd two consecutive values of D, d,d+1
(mod |D|) such that P(δ′ \ D,d + 1 (mod |D|))/P(δ′ \ D,d) is diﬀerent in the
two models. But this follows from non-identiﬁcation of P(δ′).
If Y is not a parent of D ∈ G′, then either it is further along on the back-
door path or it’s a child of some node in G′. In case 1, I must construct the
distributions along the back-door path in such a way that if P∗,G  ⊢id P(Y ′|δ′)
then P∗,G  ⊢id P(Y |δ′), where Y ′ is a node preceding Y on the path. The proof
follows closely the one in Theorem 9. In case 2, I duplicate the nodes in G′ which
lead from Y to δ′, and note that I can show non-identiﬁcation in the resulting
graph using reasoning in case 1. I obtain the result by applying Lemma 7. ￿
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Proofs for Chapter 6 (Path-speciﬁc Eﬀects)
Lemma 8 P(Yx,Z1,...,Zk) =
P
z1,...,zk P(Yx,z1,...,zk,Z1 = z1,...,Zk = zk), where
Zi = zi stands for the event “nested counterfactual variable Zi assumes values
zi.”
Proof: By deﬁnition, P(Yx,Z1,...,Zk = y) =
P
{u|Yx,Z1(u),...,Zk(u)(u)=y} P(u), and
P(Yx,z1,...,zk,Z1 = z1,...,Zk = zk) =
P
{u|Yx,z1,...,zk(u)∧Z1(u)=z1∧...∧Zk(u)=zk} P(u).
But Yx,Z1(u),...,Zk(u)(u) = y is shorthand for Yx,z1,...,zk(u) = y, where Z1(u) =
z1,...,Zk(u) = zk. The conclusion follows. ￿
Theorem 15 Let Yx,Z1,...,Zk be a nested counterfactual variable (with Z1,...,Zk
nested counterfactual variables as well). For every nested counterfactual vari-
able Wm,S1,...,Sk used in the inductive deﬁnition of Yx,Z1,...,Zk, let Wm,s1,...,sk be the







m,s1,...,sk), where the index i ranges over all
“unrolled” ordinary counterfactuals attained from nested counterfactuals which
occur in Yx,Z1,...,Zk, and s is the set of values attained by all nested counterfactu-
als in Yx,Z1,...,Zk, except Yx,Z1,...,Zk itself.
Proof: This result follows by inductive application of the argument used to es-
tablish Lemma 8. ￿
Theorem 16 Let g be a subset of “allowed edges.” Let Yx(u) − Yx∗(u) be a
116path-speciﬁc eﬀect in Mg. Then both random variables Yx,Yx∗ can be expressed
in terms of a nested counterfactual in the original model M.
Proof: It’s not diﬃcult to see that P(Yx∗) in Mg corresponds to P(Yx∗) in M.
The base case is if W has no observable parents in G. In this case, the
distribution over W is just P(W), a (trivial) counterfactual distribution, so W
can be represented as a nested counterfactual.
In the inductive case, I partition the parent set of W into four sets. Pa+
x(W)
are the parents of W along “allowed” edges in G which are also in X. Similarly,
Pa−
x(W) are the parents of W along “forbidden” edges in G which are in X.
Pa
+
x(W) are the parents of W along “allowed” edges in G which are not in X,
and Pa
−
x(W) are the parents of W along “forbidden” edges in G which are not in
X. Let x+ be the values attained by Pa+
x(W) in x, and x− be the values attained
by Pa−
x(W) in x.
I claim that P(Wx+,x−,Z1,...,Zk) represents the eﬀect of x on W in Mg. Here







x(W) can be represented by a nested counterfactual since it just equals
Zx∗ by deﬁnition. Similarly, every Z ∈ Pa
+
x(W) is expressible by a nested coun-
terfactual by the inductive hypothesis. The claim now follows by deﬁnition of
Mg and by the inductive hypothesis. ￿
Corollary 3 Let g be a subset of “allowed edges.” Let Yx(u) − Yx∗(u) be a
path-speciﬁc eﬀect in Mg. Then both random variables Yx,Yx∗ can be expressed
in terms of counterfactual distributions in the original model M.
Proof: The result trivially follows for P(Yx∗). It holds for P(Yx) due to Theo-
rems 15 and 16. ￿
Theorem 17 If rule 1 applies to Gg at V , then the path-speciﬁc eﬀect in Gg is
equal to the path-speciﬁc eﬀect in GRv
1(g). If rule 2 applies to Gg at V , then the
117path-speciﬁc eﬀect in Gg is equal to the path-speciﬁc eﬀect in GRv
2(g). If rule 3
applies to Gg at V , then the path-speciﬁc eﬀect in Gg is equal to the path-speciﬁc
eﬀect in GRv
3(g).
Proof: I want to show that in either case, the nested counterfactuals correspond-
ing to variables with incoming edges which changed status did not change after
the rule was applied. Since no other nested counterfactual variables involved in
the path-speciﬁc eﬀect is aﬀected by the marked graph modiﬁcation, our result
will follow.
This is easiest to show for rule 3. If V  ∈ De(X), V = Vx∗ = Vx, so the
result follows. If V  ∈ An(Y ), then no nested counterfactual V.. corresponding to
V appears in any nested counterfactual corresponding to variables in Y , so the
result follows.
Next, consider rule 2. The only variable to consider is the node W which is the
child of V via the arrow e considered in that rule. The nested counterfactual W..
for W has a single modiﬁcation in its subscript, that of the nested counterfactual
V.. corresponding to V . But by Lemma 9, V.. = Vx∗, so our conclusion follows.
Next, consider rule 1. I want to show the the nested counterfactual W.. cor-
responding to any Y -ancestral child W of V does not change after rule 1. Before
rule 1, W.. = WZ1
..,...,Zk






. But the nested counterfactuals V.. in both expressions
are equal by Lemma 9, which implies the result. ￿
Theorem 18 The g-speciﬁc eﬀect of Z on Y as described in Fig. 6.7 (a) is not
P∗-identiﬁable.
Proof: I extend models M1 and M2 from the previous proof with additional
variables V , Y , and UY . I assume P(uY) is uniform, and both P(V,Y |R) and
the functions which determine V and Y are the same in both models.
118Note that since all variables are discrete, the conditional probability distri-
butions can be represented as tables. If I require |R| = |V | and |Y | = |V | ∗ |R|,
then the conditional probabilities are representable as square matrices. I ﬁx the
functions fV and fY , as well as the exogenous parents of V and Y such that the
matrices corresponding to P(y|v,r) and P(v|r) matrices are invertible.
Call the extended models M3 and M4. Note that by construction, the two
models are Markovian. Since M1 and M2 have the same P∗, and since the two
extended models agree on all functions and distributions not in M1 and M2, they
must also have the same P∗.
Consider the g-speciﬁc eﬀect shown in Fig. 6.7 (a). From Theorem 3 I can
express the path-speciﬁc eﬀect in M3


















The last step is licensed by the independence assumptions encoded in the parallel
worlds model of yrv ∧ rz∗ ∧ vr′ ∧ r′
z. The same expression can be derived for
P(yz)M4
g. Note that since P∗ is the same for both models they have the same
values for the interventional distributions P(yrv) and P(vr′). Note that since
P(Y |R,V ) and P(V |R) are square matrices, the summing out of P(Y |R,V )
and P(V |R) can be viewed as a linear transformation. Since the matrices are
invertible, the transformations are one to one, and so if their composition. Since
P(yrv) = P(y|r,v) and P(vr′) = P(v|r′), and since P(rz∗ ∧ r′
z) is diﬀerent in
the two models, I obtain that P(yz)M3
g  = P(yz)M4
g. Since adding directed or
bidirected edges to a graph cannot help identiﬁability, the result also holds in
semi-Markovian models. ￿
119Theorem 19 Assume Gg is a marked graph with a single source X and a single
outcome Y , such that rules 1,2, and 3 do not apply. Then either Gg satisﬁes the
recanting witness criterion, or all marked edges emanate from X.
Proof: Assume some marked edge does not leave X, and Gg does not satisfy
the recanting witness criterion. Since rule 3 is not applicable, the marked edge
must be in An(Y ) ∩ De(X). Consider the nodes from which all marked edges in
An(Y ) ∩ De(X) emanate. Since the graph is acyclic, I can arrange these nodes
in topological order. Pick the last node in the order, call it R. Since rule 1 is
not applicable, there is an unmarked arrow leaving R in An(Y ) ∩ De(X). By
construction, there is a path from R to Y involving this arrow, and since R is
the last node in the order, this path contains no marked edges. Since rule 2 is
not applicable, there exists an allowable path from X to R. But this implies Gg
satisﬁes the recanting witness criterion, which is a contradiction. ￿
Theorem 20 Assume rules 1, 2, and 3 do not apply to Gg, and Gg satisﬁes
the recanting witness criterion. Then the g-speciﬁc eﬀect of X on Y is not P∗-
identiﬁable.
Proof: Consider the marked subgraph G′
G of Gg which just contains the paths
which witness the recanting witness criterion. Let R be the “witness” node. Let
Y.. be a nested counterfactual corresponding to the path-speciﬁc eﬀect of X on
Y in G′
g. Since R has the only marked edge leaving it, Y.. will contain two nested
counterfactuals corresponding to R, the ordinary nested counterfactual R.. which
ultimately terminates with an x subscript, and Rx∗. Note that since the only
value subscript in R.. is x, R.. = Rx by Lemma 9.
Let Y ′
.. be the nested counterfactual where R.. is replaced by Rx. By Theorem
3, Y ′
.. can be expressed in terms of a counterfactual distribution. Moreover, by
the method of construction used in the proof of Theorem 3, this distribution will
120contain a term for Rx and a term for Rx∗, and each term will have as subscripts
all parents of the corresponding variable in G′
g. Since G′
g is Markovian, each
term is thus independent of other terms. For every node W with parent Z on the
path from R to Y , I can inductively apply the argument in Theorem 18 involving
one-to-one linear maps. Speciﬁcally P(Wz) is equal to P(W|z). Moreover, since
W is not Y , I am summing it out, which means I can arrange for P(W|z) to be a
one-to-one linear map. In this way, the conditional distributions of nodes on the
two paths from R to Y compose with P(Ypa(y)G′
g) to construct a one-to-one map
from P(Rx,Rx∗) to P(Y..). But I know P(Rx,Rx∗) is not identiﬁable, so neither
is P(Y..).
To see that this translates into non-identiﬁcation of P(Y..) in Gg, note that I
can arrange it so all nodes not in G′
g are independent of nodes in G′
g, and so do
not aﬀect my reasoning. ￿
Theorem 21 If rules 1, 2, and 3 do not apply to Gg and all marked arrows
emanate from X, then the path-speciﬁc eﬀect of X on Y along g is identiﬁable
in Markovian models.
Proof: Let W be the set of children of X connected to X via a marked ar-
row, and Z the other children. Let Y.. be a nested counterfactual corresponding
to the path-speciﬁc eﬀect in question. Since the only node with both marked
and unmarked outgoing arrows is X (or possibly not even X), each variable in
De(X)∩An(Y ) gives rise to a single nested counterfactual in Y... Using Theorem
3, I can express P(Y..) in terms of a counterfactual distribution. Moreover, since
each counterfactual contains all parents as suﬃxes, and since the original graph
is Markovian, all terms are independent of all other terms. But this means the
expression is experimentally identiﬁable. ￿
Theorem 23 If the unmarking rule applies to Gg at e, then path-speciﬁc eﬀect
121in Gg is equal to the path-speciﬁc eﬀect in GRe
4(g).
Proof: As before, I want to show that in either case, the nested counterfactuals
corresponding to variables with incoming edges which changed status did not
change after the rule was applied. Since no other nested counterfactual variables
involved in the path-speciﬁc eﬀect is aﬀected by the marked graph modiﬁcation,
the result will follow.
If there is no marked directed path from X to V , then we can partition X into
two subsets X1,X2, where e is not a descendant of nodes in X1, while all directed
paths from X2 to e are blocked by a marked edge. Let V be the node from which
e emanates. Then, V = Vx∗
1. Furthermore, if I apply the unmarking rule to
e, the nested counterfactual W.., where W is the child of V via e, has a single
modiﬁcation in its subscript, that of the nested counterfactual V.. corresponding
to V . But since there are no allowed path from X2 to V , V.. = Vx∗
2.
If V  ∈ An(Y), a nested counterfactual corresponding to V does not appear
in any nested counterfactuals corresponding to nodes in Y, so the result follows.
￿
Theorem 24 Assume Gg is a marked graph, I am interested in a g-speciﬁc
eﬀect of X on Y, and neither rule 1, nor the unmarking rule are applicable to
Gg. Then either all marked edges emanate from nodes in X, or there is a node
R such that there is an allowed directed path from X to R, an allowed directed
path from R to Y, and a forbidden directed path from R to Y. See Fig. 6.8.
Proof: Assume such an R does not exist, and some marked edge does not emanate
from X. Consider the nodes which all such marked edges emanate. Since the
graph is acyclic, I can arrange these nodes in topological order. Pick the last
node in the order, call it R. Since the unmarking rule is not applicable, R is both
ancestral to Y, and there is a directed path from X to R. Since rule 1 is not
122applicable, there is an unmarked arrow leaving R which is a part of a directed
path from R to Y , and by construction this path contains no marked edges. By
construction, there is a path from R to Y involving e, which means I have a
contradiction. ￿
Theorem 25 Assume Gg contains the patterns shown in Fig. 6.8. Then the
g-speciﬁc eﬀect of X on Y is not P∗-identiﬁable.
Proof: The proof is almost identical to that of Theorem 20. I ﬁrst show that the
counterfactual distribution representing the eﬀect of interest must contain the
terms Rx,Rx∗, for some X. I then use induction on the path of the generalized kite
graph that this implies the path-speciﬁc eﬀect of X on {Y1,Y2} is not identiﬁable
from P∗. By making sure that all nodes in Gg outside the generalized kite are
independent of nodes inside the generalized kite, I conclude the non-identiﬁability
of the eﬀect of X on Y. ￿
Theorem 26 Assume all marked arrows emanate from X in Gg. Then the
path-speciﬁc eﬀect of X on Y is identiﬁable in Markovian models.
Proof: The proof is almost identical to that of Theorem 21. The only diﬀerence is
that since there are multiple variables in Y, a given node can give rise to multiple
nested counterfactuals. However, since the only nodes with both marked and
unmarked outgoing arrows are those in X, and they do not give rise to nested
counterfactuals, any node not in X will give rise to multiple nested counterfactuals
which are syntactically identical, and so are duplicate events. Since the graph is
Markovian, each counterfactual with its parents ﬁxed is independent of all others.
Thus, the whole expression is P∗-identiﬁable. ￿
123APPENDIX D
Proofs for Chapter 7 (Dormant Independence)
Theorem 29 For any variable Y in G, there exists a unique maximum ancestral
confounded set (MACS) Ty.
Proof: Maximal ancestral confounded sets exist for any Y since I only consider
ﬁnite graphs. Assume there is Y with two distinct maximal ancestral confounded
sets S1,S2. I claim that S = S1 ∪ S2 is an ancestral confounded set, which is
a contradiction. By construction, S is a C-component in GS, since any node
X ∈ S1 and any node Z ∈ S2 can be connected by a bidirected path constructed
by appending the bidirected path from X to Y in GS1 (guaranteed to exist since S1
is a C-component in GS1) to the bidirected path from Z to Y in GS2 (guaranteed
to exist since S2 is a C-component in GS2). Since S1 ∈ An(Y )GS1, and S2 ∈
An(Y )GS2, S ∈ An(Y )GS. ￿
Theorem 30 Find-MACS(G,Y ) outputs the MACS of Y in polynomial time.
Proof: The algorithm is polynomial since determining An(.) and C(.) sets can
be done in polynomial time, and each recursive call eliminates at least one node
from the graph. Since the MACS of Y is unique, all ancestral confounding sets
of Y are contained in it (otherwise, I can repeat the argument in Theorem 29).
First, I show that the output set S of Find-MACS is an ancestral confounding
set of Y . If not, then either S  = An(Y )GS or S  = C(Y ). But the algorithm
only returns if there is no element in S outside An(Y )GS, and no element in S
outside C(Y )GS. To show that S is maximum, assume this isn’t the case, and let
124Z ⊆ Ty \ S be the ﬁrst node set in Ty removed by Find-MACS. Let G′ be the
graph at the stage where Z is removed. By assumption, Ty is contained in G′,
and either Z  ⊂ An(Y )G′ or Z  ⊂ C(Y )G′. But Z ⊂ An(Y )GTy, and Z ⊂ C(Y )GTy
by deﬁnition of Ty. Contradiction. ￿
Theorem 31 Let Tx,Ty be the MACSs of X,Y . Let Ix,y = Pa(Tx∪Ty)\(Tx∪Ty).
Then if either X is a parent of Ty, Y is a parent of Tx or there is a bidirected
arc between Tx an Ty, then X,Y are not d*-separable. Otherwise, X ⊥ix,y Y |Tx∪
Ty \ {X,Y }.
Proof: Assume either X is a parent of Ty or Tx,Ty are connected by a bidirected
arc. It’s easy to verify, by deﬁnition of Ty, that the the above imply the presence
of an inducing path [VP90] from X to Y . Thus, no conditioning set can d-
separate X and Y . I want to show that identiﬁable interventions don’t help.
Consider disjoint subsets S,S′ of Ty. A result in [SP06a] implies that P(v),G  ⊢id
P(y|s′,do(s)) iﬀ P(v),G  ⊢id P(y,t|do(s,t′)), where T,T ′ is a certain partition of
S′. By Theorem 28, P(v),G  ⊢id P(y|do(w)) for any subset W of Ty, which in
turn implies P(v),G  ⊢id P(y,t|do(s,t)). But if P(v),G  ⊢id P(y|s′,do(s)), then
P(v),G  ⊢id P(y,x|s′,do(s)). It is not diﬃcult to construct a model where for
any superset Z of S′, and superset W of S, P(v),G  ⊢id P(y,x|z,do(w)) (by for
instance letting nodes outside Ty be mutually independent). This implies the
result.
To show the other direction, consider Gix,y, and a possible d-connected path
from X to Y . This path starts with an arrow leaving X or an arrow entering
X. Assume the arrow is leaving X. X cannot have conditioned descendants in
Gix,y unless X was a parent of Ty or x ∈ Ty, both of which are impossible by
assumption. This means the path from X is just a set of directed arrows from
X. But such a path must run into nodes ﬁxed by Ix,y, unless X was a parent of
125Ty or in Ty, which is impossible. Thus, no path starting with an outgoing arrow
from X can be d-connected to Y .
Assume the path starts with an incoming arrow into X. If the arrow is
directed, the corresponding parent Z of X is either in Tx or in Ix,y (and in
neither case can Z be equal to Y ). In either case, the path is not d-connected to
Y . If the arrow is bidirected, I have two cases. Either the next node Z in the
path is in Ty or outside both Ty and Ix,y (Z cannot be in Ix,y since then the path
will not be d-connected). For the ﬁrst case, I repeat the argument until I reach
the second case. For the second case, Z cannot be in Tx, else there is a bidirected
path from Tx to Ty, which is ruled out by assumption. Note that Z cannot have
conditioned descendants in Gix,y unless Z was a parent of Tx or Ty or was in Tx
or Ty. But I ruled all these cases out. Therefore, the subsequent arrows on the
path are directed arrows away from Z. As before, these arrows must eventually
reach Ix,y, which means the path is not d-connected. ￿
Lemma 11 Every AC-component has an ancestral confounded set.
Proof: If an AC-component is a singleton, this is obvious. Otherwise, Y is a union
of AC-components Y1,Y2 with ancestral confounded sets S1,S2. Let S = S1∪S2.
Since there is a bidirected arc from S1 to S2, for every node X ∈ S,S = C(X)S.
Moreover, by construction S = An(Y)S. Thus, S is an ancestral confounded set
for Y. ￿
Lemma 12 Let Y be a variable set, Y ∈ Y. Then there is a unique maximum
AC-component which both contains Y and is a subset of Y.
Proof: Some such AC-component exists, since Y itself is a trivial AC-component.
Since Y is ﬁnite there is a maximal such AC-component. Assume there are
two distinct maximal AC-components containing Y which are subsets of Y, say
Y1,Y2. Let S1,S2 be the corresponding MACSs. Since these AC-components
126have the node Y in common, S1 and S2 have a node in common, and so are
connected by a bidirected arc. This implies Y1 ∪Y2 is an AC-component, which
is a contradiction. ￿
Theorem 33 Any variable set Y has a unique partition p, called the AC-
partition, where each element S in p is a maximal AC-component in a sense
that no superset of S which is also a subset of Y is an AC-component.
Proof: To see that there is a unique AC-partition p, start with some node Y ∈ Y,
ﬁnd it’s unique maximum AC-component which is still a subset of Y, and repeat
the process for the nodes which have not been made part of some AC-component.
The set of AC-components obtained in this way is a partition where each element
is a maximal AC-component. Since each AC-component is also maximum and
unique, p is unique. ￿
Theorem 34 Find-AC-Partition(G,Y) outputs the unique AC-partition of
Y, and the set of MACSs for each element in the partition.
Proof: I ﬁrst show that p, the output of Find-AC-Partition, consists of a
partition of AC-components (not necessarily maximal). Clearly this is true at
the initialization step, since a singleton is a trivial AC-component. It’s also
clear by deﬁnition that any merge of Y1,Y2 results in an AC-component Y
′.
Furthermore, by Theorem 7, Ty′ is the MACS of Y
′.
Let p∗ be the AC-partition of Y. I claim that p∗ must be coarser than p, in
a sense that every element in p∗ is a union of a set of elements in p. Note that
this deﬁnition holds if p∗ is equal to p. Assume not. Then there are some sets
S ∈ p,S′ ∈ p∗ such that some elements in S are in S′ and some are not. Let
Z ∈ S∩S′. By Lemma 12, there is a unique maximum AC-component containing
Z which is also a subset of Y. By deﬁnition of p∗, S′ is this AC-component. But
if S is not contained in S′, I can derive a contradiction by repeating the argument
127in the proof of Lemma 12.
Finally, I want to show p∗ is equal to p. Assume this isn’t the case, and ﬁx some
element S′ in p∗ which is a union of two or more elements in p. Since each AC-
component is either a singleton, or constructed from two smaller AC-components,
I can construct a binary tree T, where each leaf is a node in S′, and each non-leaf
represents an AC-component obtained from the AC-component corresponding to
the left subtree of the non-leaf and the AC-component corresponding to the right
subtree of the non-leaf.
I want to ﬁnd an AC-component A in T with the property that its left subtree
corresponds to a subset of some element S1 in p, and its right subtree corresponds
to a subset of another element S2 in p. This AC-component must exist, since
leaves in T are singletons, and the root of T corresponds to S′, which spans
multiple elements in p. This implies that the MACS of a subset of S1 is connected
to the MACS of a subset of S2 by a bidirected arc. But the MACS of S1 and
the MACS of S2 are supersets of these connected MACS, so they are themselves
connected by a bidirected arc. But then p could not have been the output of
Find-AC-Partition. ￿
Theorem 35 X cannot be d-separated from Y in G if and only if there exists
an inducing path from X to Y in G,
Proof: Assume there is no inducing path from X to Y. Let A = An(X ∪ Y) \
(X∪Y). I claim that X ⊥ Y|A. It’s not hard to see that if there is a d-connected
path from X to Y, then it does not have any nodes not in A. Assume otherwise.
Then some node on this path not in A must contain a collider. But this implies
the path is not d-connected, since this node does not have descendants in A.
Since I condition on A, the d-connected path must consist exclusively of
colliders. Moreover, by deﬁnition every node on the path is an ancestor of either
128X or Y. But this means the path is inducing. Contradiction.
Assume the inducing path from X to Y . I want to show I cannot d-separate
X from Y. First, I show that X  ⊥ Y.
I have three cases. The inducing path contains either entirely bidirected arcs,
or one directed arc following by zero or more bidirected arcs, or one directed arc,
following by zero or more bidirected arcs, followed by a directed arc.
Let A be the ﬁrst node on the inducing path after X, B be the ﬁrst node
on the inducing path after Y . If all nodes on the inducing path are ancestors
of X, then B is an ancestor of X. But the edge between Y and B is either
bidirected, or directed from Y to B. In either case, the ancestral path from X
to B plus this edge forms a d-connected path from X to Y . The same argument
applies if all nodes on the inducing path are ancestors of Y. Otherwise, ﬁnd two
neighboring nodes C,D on the inducing path where C is an ancestor of X, and
D is an ancestor of Y. Then the ancestral path from X to C, along with the
edge along the inducing path from C to D, along with the ancestral path from
Y to D form a d-connected path from X to Y.
What I have to show is that regardless of which sets of nodes I condition on,
some d-connected path between X and Y remains. Let p′ the subpath of p such
that nodes on p′ are either conditioned on themselves, or their descendants are
conditioned on. If p′ = p, I am done since p is d-connected. Otherwise, consider
every pair of nodes A,B on p \ p′ such that all nodes on p between A and B
are in p′. By construction, the fragment of p between A and B is a d-connected
path, terminating with arrowheads on both ends. To show that there is a d-
connected path between X and Y, we repeat the above d-connection argument,
except rather than considering the path p, I consider the path p\p′, and instead
of the d-connected paths between every node pair A,B as above, I consider a
129bidirected arc. ￿
Theorem 36 Let X,Y be arbitrary sets of variables. Let p be the AC-partition
of X∪Y. Then if either elements of both X and Y share a single AC-component
in p, or some element of X is a parent of the MACS of some AC-component
containing elements of Y (or vice versa), then X cannot be d*-separated from
Y. Otherwise, let Tp be the union of all MACSs of elements in p, and let Ip =
Pa(Tp) \ Tp. Then, X ⊥ip Y|Tp \ (X ∪ Y).
Proof: What I want to show is that the conditions for the absence of d*-separation
of sets X,Y imply that there is an inducing path between X and Y, and that no
interventions on nodes in that inducing path are identiﬁable, at least if either X
or Y are the eﬀect variables.
I ﬁrst want to show that if Z is an AC-component, then for any disjoint
subsets S,S′ of the MACS Tz, P(v),G  ⊢id P(z|s′,do(s)). By a result from
[SP06a], P(v),G  ⊢id P(z|s′,do(s)) iﬀ P(v),G  ⊢id P(z,t|do(s,t′)), where T,T ′ is
a particular partition of S′. But if P(v),G  ⊢id P(z|do(s,t′)), then P(v),G  ⊢id
P(z,t|do(s,t′)). Without loss of generality, then, I will prove that P(v),G  ⊢id
P(z|do(s)). By Theorem 28, this is true if Z = {Z}. Assume this is true for
AC-components Z1,Z2. I want to show this also holds for the AC-component
Z obtained from these two AC-components. Clearly, the result also holds for
T = Tz1 ∪Tz2. I want to show the same is true for Tz. By construction, Tz can be
used to construct a C-forest [SP06b] for Z. The same is true for T. Then T,Tz
form a hedge [SP06b] for P(z|do(s′)), for any set S′ ⊆ Tz \ T, which means the
result holds for Tz.
If there is an AC-component containing both elements of X and Y, then
an inducing path between X and Y exists by the deﬁnition of AC-component.
Similarly, if some element of X is a parent of the MACS of some AC-component
130which is a subset of Y, then an inducing path between X and Y exists by the
deﬁnition of AC-component.
If there is an AC-component C containing both elements of X and Y, then
by above reasoning for any disjoint subsets S,S′ of Tz, P(v),G  ⊢id P(c|s′,do(s)).
Similarly, if there is an element of X which is a parent of the MACS of some
AC-component Y
′ which is a subset of Y, then by above reasoning for any
disjoint subsets S,S′, P(v),G  ⊢id P(y′|s′,do(s)). As before, it is not diﬃcult
to construct a model where for any superset Z of S′ and superset W of S,
P(v),G  ⊢id P(c|z,do(w)) (in the ﬁrst case), or P(v),G  ⊢id P(y′|z,do(w)), (in
the second case). In either case, no combination of ﬁxing and conditioning can
get rid of the inducing path, and the result follows.
To prove the other direction, consider a d-connected path in Gip from X ∈ X
to Y ∈ Y. Without loss of generality, assume no elements in X,Y, other than
the end points are on this path.
The path either starts with an outgoing arrow, an incoming arrow, or a bidi-
rected arrow. Assume it starts with an outgoing arrow into a node Z. If Z is
inside some MACS, the next edge on the path can be assumed to be bidirected.
This is because this MACS cannot contain any nodes in Y, and because the next
node Z is conditioned on by assumption. Since the arrow is bidirected, I handle
this case in the “bidirected arrow” situation. If Z is outside any MACS, it is
either in Ip, in which case the path is not d-connected, or it does not have any
conditioned descendants, since the parents of every MACS are ﬁxed. This means
the segment of the path from Z is just a set of directed arrows pointing away
from Z. But such a path must run into nodes ﬁxed by Ip, which is impossible.
Thus there are no d-connected path starting with an outgoing arrow from X.
Assume the path starts with an incoming arrow into X. If the arrow is
131directed, the corresponding parent Z of X is either in Tp. or in Ip. If it is in Ip,
the path is not d-connected, since no element of Y can be a parent of the MACS
of an AC-component containing X by assumption. If it is in Tp, it is conditioned
on, and the path is not d-connected.
If the arrow is bidirected, I have two cases. Either the next node Z in the
path is in the MACS of an AC-component containing X, or outside both this AC-
component, and Ip. For the ﬁrst case, I repeat the argument until I reach the sec-
ond case. For the second case, Z cannot be in any other MACS. Otherwise, there
is a bidirected arc between distinct MACSs returned by Find-AC-Partition
which is impossible by Theorem 34. Note that Z cannot have conditioned descen-
dants in Gip unless Z was in Ip, which is impossible. Therefore, the subsequent
arrows on the path are directed arrows away from Z. As before, these arrows
must eventually reach Ip, which means the path is not d-connected. ￿
Theorem 37 Test-Edges terminates in polynomial time, and any edge it re-
moves from G′, valid for an experimentally faithful model M, is extraneous.
Proof: The ﬁrst claim is simple to establish since all input graphs are acyclic, and
using Theorem 32. Let G be the true causal graph. Assume an edge (X,Y ) is not
extraneous but is removed from G′ by Test-Edges. Assume sets Z,W witness
the removal. But X ⊥ ⊥w Y |Z, and since the submodel Mw of M is faithful, this
implies (X,Y ) must be extraneous. ￿
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